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Abstract 
The topic of this paper is humanitarian intervention. In the first part it scrutinizes several cases 
of intervention in the last decades. The main emphasis is put on a brief description of the causes of 
the humanitarian crisis and the reaction of the international community as well as the reaction of the 
United Nations. The results are used to support the point of view that a moral duty to intervene has 
start to arise. However, it is still in question how such interventions are legally justified. The reaction 
of the Security Council and its means to do so, mainly to determine a "threat to international peace 
and security", are analysed. Although Security Council authorisation is the most legitimate and 
recognised justification, it shows some grave disadvantages, which are pointed out in detail. Further 
on the paper takes a look at humanitarian intervention under customary international law. It takes the 
point of view that such a custom might be on the rise, but is until now not sufficient to provide 
undisputed and clear authorisation. Nevertheless the paper argues for a need of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. The dilemma between this need, the shortcomings of Security Council 
Intervention and the lack of sufficient customary law calls for active 'intervention' of the 
international community: This paper argues for the creation of a tool under international law 
addressing human rights abuses explicitly and authorising the use of force as last resort, if all other 
measures included in this tool fail. 
This paper contains approximately 12.500 words. 
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Humanitarian Intervention: A Need to Intervene Needs Codification 
I INTRODUCTION 
In May 2003 the German Federal President Johannes Rau stated: international 
law has to be advanced 'where it turns out to be law against nations, because it 
protects dictatorships that torture their population' .1 This was stated in regard to the 
situation in Iraq and, indeed, that regime seemed to be in severe breach of 
humanitarian law .2 British Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasized that as further 
justification to go to war. 3 Massive violations of human rights occur in various 
forms, which might even widen the need for modification of international law. 
Liberia and Congo are just recent examples, where it took a long time for the 
. . . 4 United Nations Security Council to pass resolutions concernmg mtervention. 
Somalia, Haiti and, most of all, the Rwanda are further examples. Intervention took 
place even without Security Council authorisation in Cambodia, Uganda and 
Kosovo; the reactions varied from tacit agreement to condemnation. In other cases 
the authorisation remained ambiguous or humanitarian concerns were even 
secondary: Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples. 
These cases show a lack of uniform criteria for applying humanitarian 
intervention and prove more or less, that decision making about whether to 
intervene or not is highly based on political concerns. Whether humanitarian 
intervention is legal under international law is highly disputed until now. The cases 
1 Johannes Rau, German Federal President, " Berlin Speech" (Maxim Gorki Theatre, Berlin , 19 May 
2003); can be found at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/,-488168/Bulletin.htrn> (last 
accessed 21 July 2003), trans lated by the author. 
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Britain Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses 
(2 December 2002), can be found at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/hrdoss ier.pdf> (last 
accessed 3 August 2003). 
3 Tony Blair, Briti sh Prime Mini ster , "Speech to the Commons" (House of Commons, London , 18 
March 2003), can be found at: <http://politics.g uardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0, 12956,9 16790,00.html> 
(last accessed 28 July 2003). 
4 SC Res 1497, U Doc S/RES/1497 (2003); 
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show, however, that humanitarian interventions took place in the past, but they also 
show that there is, up until now, no common legal ground for intervention and that 
the legality of humanitarian intervention remains unclear. Humanitarian 
intervention in this paper equates to be forceful measures. 
In scrutinizing the listed cases of humanitarian intervention this paper will 
argue for a need and a duty to intervene as means of last resort to prevent severe 
humanitarian catastrophes, but will also show that there has been no legal obligation 
up until now, even though it might be morally desirable. In the second part it will 
describe means to authorise humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter and 
will demonstrate with these cases the deficiencies and dangers of the line taken by 
the Security Council. Also it will show the shortcomings and flaw of humanitarian 
intervention under customary international law and its problems concerning state 
responsibility, and therefore argue a need for strong and clear liability of the United 
Nations. However, it will not describe customary law of humanitarian intervention 
too detailed as the literature about that is already various as well as the outcomes of 
it. Instead, this paper will suggest the implementation of a legal instrument under 
the umbrella of United Nations to address honestly what is now often done in a 
hidden form: Stronger recognizing of human rights when life is at stake at expense 
of the doctrine of sovereignty. 
11 INTERVENTION AND MORAL DUTY 
A Cases of Humanitarian Intervention 
Even though the UN Charter narrowed down the legality of use of force after 
World War II, several cases of forceful interventions occurred. Some of them are 
considered to be justified by humanitarian grounds. To scrutinize some of these 
cases serves the purpose of establishing similarities and differences with regard to 
the human rights abuses, the reaction of states and the reaction of the community of 
states. In the last half of the century several interventions took place . This questions 
whether a duty to intervene arises. 
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I Genocide in Cambodia 
In 1975 the Khmer Rouge regime by Pol Pot seized power in Cambodia and 
implemented a leadership by torture, displacement and extensive killing. It is 
assumed that in less than four years two million people were killed, about one-
quarter of the population. 5 The Security Council discussed this issue but could not 
decide whether or not to intervene.
6 In 1977 troops of the Khmer Rouge 
occasionally crossed the border and attacked Vietnamese villages. As a result 
Vietnamese troops marched into Cambodia in 1978.
7 Vietnam not only replaced 
the Pol Pot regime, but also established a government strongly dependent on 
Vietnam. 8 The international community condemned Vietnam's assumption of 
power and also rejected Vietnam's right of intervention based on humanitarian 
concerns. For example, New Zealand stated on the 2110th meeting of the Security 
Council on 13 January 1979: " [T]he misdeeds of one State do not. .. justify the 
invasion of its territory by another".
9 In fact the Vietnamese government never tried 
to legitimise its intervention on humanitarian grounds. Due to the political 
differences during the cold war period a condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion 
by Security Council resolution was impossible to draft, as the Soviet Union vetoed 
it. 10 The General Assembly however condemned the invasion , called for 
withdrawal, and pointed out that even if human rights are at stake interve ntion is not 
a legal means . 11 The Vietnamese puppet regime in Cambodia was also known for 
5 Natalino Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity (Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrec ht , 1985) 98 . 
6 Douglas Eisner " Humanitarian Intervention in Post-Cold War Era" ( 1993) 11 Boston U lnt ' L J 
195,206. 
7 Douglas Eisner " Humanitarian Intervention in Post-Cold War Era" (1993) 11 Boston U lnt ' L J 
195,206. 
8 W Michael Reismann "Articl e 2 (4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law" ( 1984) 
78 Am Soc lnt' L Proceedin gs 68. 
9 SC 211011! Meeting, UN Doc S/PV .2 110 ( 1979). 
10 Natalino Ron zi tti Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and /11ten 1e11tio11 on 
Grounds of Humanity (Martin us Nijhoff Publi shers, Dordrecht, 1985) 99. 
11 34th Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc NRES/3422(XXX) (1979). 
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human rights violations as well. However, they paled into insignificance in contrast 
to the monstrous slaughter of the Pol Pot regime. 
2 Intervention in Uganda 
Since 1971 the dictatorship of Idi Amin was responsible for the killing of about 
300,000 Ugandans and severe cruel ties among his people.
12 At the end of 1978, 
Ugandan forces seized parts of Tanzanian territory in the Kagera River region. In 
response Tanzania attacked Uganda together with Ugandan rebels , gained control 
over the capital Kampala in April 1979, and ousted Amin from power.
13 The 
justificati on for the use of force remained unclear However, Tanzanian President 
Nyerere emphasised the right of self-defence as well as humanitarian concems.
14 
Among scholars it is contentious which justification prevails and which one is to 
follow , but a separation of both motives seems impossible, therefore it has to be 
acknowledged that both played a role in deciding to attack Uganda and overthrow 
the government. 15 After all, thi s was the most secure measure to prevent further 
attacks against Tanzanian terri tory. In any event, the international community was 
quick to recognize the new government of Uganda, welcomed the change and did 
not discuss the invasion within the Security Council or the General Assembly.
16 
Therefore it must be assumed that the international community tacitly understood 
the cause as just; only Sudan and Nigeria objected to Tanzanians intervention .
17 
12 Douglas Eisner " Humanitari an Intervention in Post-Cold War Era" ( I 993) 11 Boston U lnt ' L J 
195,203. 
13 Fernando R Teson Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (2"d Ed, 
Transnational Publi shers, New York, 1997) 180 - 182. 
14 Natalino Ron zitti Rescu ing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity (Martin us ijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) I 02 - 105. 
15 Compare also : Douglas Eisner " Humanitarian Intervention in Po t-Cold War Era" ( I 993) 11 
Boston U lnt ' L J 195, 204. 
16 Fernando R Teson Humanitarian lmervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (2nd Ed, 
Transnati onal Publi shers, New York, 1997) 186. 
17 Nigerias objec tion was based on di scomfort about the use of force in general, rather then on 
overthrow the Amin dictatorsh ip, see Nigerias statement : Natalino Ronz itti Rescuing Nationals 
Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publi shers, Dordrecht, 1985) l 05 - l 06. 
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3 The Somalia Disaster 
In January 1991 despotic Somali President Barre was overthrown. The already 
violent and poor country drifted into a bloody civil war where several bands fought 
against each other and civi I order broke down completely.
18 A reconciliation 
conference took place in Djibouti in July 1991 , where Omer Arteh was appointed as 
interim Prime Minister but his success of settling the war and restoring peace was 
limited. 19 In January 1992 he requested action by the Security Council, which was 
followed by numerous resolutions.
20 A ceasefire agreement in March was ignored 
by the warlords. In August Resolution 75 l created UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) and an agreement about their deployment was reached with the 
warlord Aidid.21 Nevertheless, the civil war continued and humanitarian disaster 
increased. The Secretary General predicted that by the end of 1992 over 500,000 
civilians would be refugees. He also reported that 4.5 million people were starving 
and that no functional health-care system existed.
22 
The situation declined, high numbers of civilians died of starvation and the 
armed gangs prevented the United Nations from carrying out help.
23 This led to the 
deployment of armed forces in September.
24 Again, this did not stop the anarchistic 
conditions. In December the Security Council defined the situation as a ' threat to 
international peace and security', justifying the use of force under chapter VII of the 
Charter. 25 Under the rule of the United States the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) 
18 Jane Perlez "2 Months after Ousting Despot, Somalia Faces Life as an Abandoned Pawn" (4 April 
1991) New York Times A 3. 
19 Mark R Hutchinson "UN Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention" ( 1993) 34 Harv lnt' L J 624, 626. 
20 SC Res 733, UN Doc S/RES/733 (1992);SC Res 746, UN Doc S/RES/746 (1992); SC Res 751, 
UN Doc S/RES/751 (1992); SC Res 767, UN Doc S/RES/767 (1992); SC Res 775, UN Doc 
S/RES/775 (1992). 
21 SC Res 751, UN Doc S/RES/751 (1992). 
22 Report of the Secretary General 011 the Situation in Somalia (22 July 1992), UN Doc S/24343. 
23 Report of the Secretary General 011 the Situation i11 Somalia (24 August 1992), U Doc S/24480. 
24 SC Res 775, U Doc S/RES/775 ( 1992). 
25 SC Res 794, UN Doc S/RES/794 ( 1992). 
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was sent to Somalia, which was, at first, successful in establishing an order 
allowing delivery of food and supply to the impoverished population. After this 
military intervention another peacekeeping m1ss1on, UNOSOM II, was 
implemented in March 1993.26 Riots broke out again and in July 1993 25 Pakistani 
peacekeepers were killed.27 The Security Council agreed in resolution 865 to follow 
the recommendations of the Secretary General,
28 that disarming of the gangs would 
be essential to enforce peace. 29 Nevertheless attacks on UNOSOM II forces went on 
and in October the well-known disastrous mission to capture Aidid was started, 
which culminated in a daylong street fight leaving 12 US soldiers and 60 Somalis 
dead behind, raising the death-toll of UN forces to sixty.30 The psychological 
impact was great and led finally to the withdrawal of foreign troops until March 
1995.31 
The involvement of the United Nations in Somalia was unique. It started as a 
usual peacekeeping mission, violently opposed within the country.
32 For the 
Security Council it seemed necessary to authorise the use of force under Chapter 
VII of the Charter to reinstall an environment where peacekeeping and 
humanitarian help could be carried out. 33 The UNOSOM II mission in tum shifted 
from a humanitarian to a military mission, increasingly criticized by UN 
members. 34 Looking back at the three years of intervention in Somalia it seems to 
26 SC Res 814, U Doc S/RES/814 ( 1993). 
27 Kenne th S Freeman "Punishing Attacks on United Nations Peacekeepers: a Case Study of 
Somalia" ( 1994) 8 Emory lnt ' L Rev 845, 845. 
28 SC Res 865, U Doc S/RES/865 ( 1993). 
29 Further Report of the Secretary General ( 17 August 1993), U Doc S/26317. 
30 John H Cushman "5 Gl's Killed as Somalis Down 2 US Helicopters" (4 October 1993) New York 
Times A l. 
31 SC Res 954, UN Doc S/RES/954 (1995). 
32 Sonia K Han " Building a Peace That Lasts: The United ations and Post-Civil War Peace-
Building" ( 1994) 26 NYU J lnt' L & Pol 837, 862 - 867. 
33 Sonia K Han " Building a Peace That Lasts : The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-
Building" ( 1994) 26 NYU J lnt ' L & Pol 837, 862 - 867. 
34 Keith B Richburg "UN Report Criticizes Military Tactics of Somalia Peace Keepers" (5 August 
1993) The Washington Post A 22. 
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be a great disaster and it is questioned, whether the Security Council exceeded their 
authority, and intervened illegally in internal affairs. 35 For the purpose of this paper 
it is notable, that intervention in general always has to deal with this balance 
between humanitarian concerns and sovereignty, which will be addressed in more 
detail later on. However, the UN involvement, at least in the beginning, helped to 
prevent a worsening of humanitarian catastrophe. Also noticeable is the emphasis of 
the unique situation by the Security Council itself, concerned about not setting a 
precedent. 36 This is not unfounded, as the Council had to fall back upon addressing 
a 'threat to international peace and security', instead of pointing out the real 
motivation: humanitarian concerns about Somalia, but not so much the impact of 
refugees on the stability of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. 
4 Haiti Intervention 
Haiti suffered under the dictatorship of the Duvalier family for decades. This 
dictatorship was overthrown in 1986 and in 1990 Jean - Bertrand Aristide was 
democratically elected as president, but his presidency was short lasting. A military 
coup in 1991 drove him out of his office and the country .
37 The following military 
rule was accompanied by a high rate of refugees and a great toll of lives among 
civilians, causing a humanitarian catastrophe.
38 
The Security Council responded with a resolution implementing an embargo.
39 
They also called the humanitarian crisis a ' threat for international peace and 
security' .40 In 1993 an agreement between the military regime and Aristide was 
reached, aiming for the re-instalment of the democratic government and the 
35 Marc M Boutin "Somalia: The Legality of UN Forcible Humanitarian Intervention" 17 Suffolk 
Transn' L Rev 138,159 - 162. 
36 Ruth Gordon United ations Intervention in Internal Connicts: Iraq, Somalia and Beyond" ( 1994) 
15 Mich J lnt' L 138, 550 - 558. 
37 Howard W French "Haitian Military and Aristide Sign Pact to End Cri sis" (4 July 1993) New York 
Times I, I. 
38 Daniel James " What Next in Haiti?" (28 May 1993) The Washington Post F 3. 
39 SC Res 841, Un Doc S/RES/841 ( 1993). 
40 SC Res 841, Un Doc S/RES/841 (1993). 
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deployment of UN troops on the island.41 Notwithstanding the promise of the 
military leader to accept a multinational force called 'UN Mission on Haiti' 
(UNMIH), he organised civil bands to block the harbour and to initiate riots to 
prevent their atTival. 42 Violence continued, members of the former democratic 
government were assassinated and the number of refugees from Haiti rose.
43 
Meanwhile the Security Council re-employed the embargo.
44 However, mostly 
civilians seemed to suffer from the embargo. Nevertheless even harder sanctions 
were imposed in 1994.45 In July 1994 the Security Council finally authorised the 
use of force and in September United States troops landed in Haiti.
46 
The intervention in Haiti is now often refetTed to as a 'pro-democratic' 
intervention, rather than humanitarian intervention.
47 Indeed, the United States 
President addressed the humanitarian aspect of intervention only at the beginning of 
the military invasion ... 8 It is arguable that vested interests also motivated United 
States involvement. The United States, main initiator of Security Council actions, 
was receiving thousands of Haitian refugees and was also concerned about drug 
trafficking. Nevertheless, the humanitarian crisis in Haiti cannot be denied and 
therefore the intervention also had humanitarian importance. Negotiations with the 
41 Howard W French " Haitian Military and Aristide Sign Pact to Ende Cri sis" (4 July 1993) New 
York Times 1,1; SC Res 867, UN Doc S/RES/867 (1993). 
~
2 DJ Lecce " International Law Regarding Pro-Democratic Intervention : A Study of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti" (1998) 45 Naval L Rev 247, 255. 
43 Howard W French "Justice Minister Slain in Defiance of US Warning to Military to Keep Peace" 
(15 October 1993) New York Times A I. 
44 SC Res 873, UN Doc S/RES/873 (l 993). 
45 SC Res 917, UN Doc S/RES/917 ( 1994). 
~
6 SC Res 940, UN Doc S/RES/940 ( 1994); Larry Rother "3000 Troops Land Without Opposition 
and Take over Ports and Airfields in Haiti " (20 September 1994) New York Times A I. 
47 Richard Falk "The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United 
Nations" ( 1995) 36/2 Harv lnt' L J 341,343 - 346. 
48 William J Clinton, President of the United States, "Remarks by the President in Television 
Address to the Nation" (Oval Office, Washington DC, 15 September 1994), can be found at: 
<http://clinton6.nara.gov/ 1994/09/ 1994-09- 15-president-in-tv-address-to-nation-on-haiti.html> (last 
accessed 18 August 2003). 
12 
military junta turned out to be fruitless and sanctions in form of embargoes hit 
innocent inhabitants, but did not achieve their purpose of removing a cruel 
leadership. The military intervention therefore seemed to be the last possible means 
to resolve the situation. It was legitimised by explicit Security Council 
authorisation, although it was questioned if the Security Council, for its part, went 
beyond what is permissible.
49 However, the Council took the point of view that 
there was a threat for international peace and security and acted within its 
discretionary power. 
5 The Rwanda Slaughter 
In the early 1990s a civil war broke out in Rwanda between the Hutu , the 
majority, and the Tutsi, the minority, who nevertheless had ruled the country since 
independence in the 1960s . The Tutsi increasingly lost power in the following 
decades. 50 A ceasefire was negotiated in August 1993. However, with the lethal 
shooting of Hutu President Habyarimana's plane on 6 April 1994,
51 war broke out 
again accompanied with massive slaughter and outstanding cruelty by Hutu para-
military groups and militias. Victims included the Tutsi and moderate Hutu .
52
. In 
August 1994 United Nations Secretary General reported: "Of a total population of 
approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 people have been killed, 3 million 
displaced internally and more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries."
53 
A United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 2,500 men, 
deployed in 1993 to watch the ceasefire, remained nearly inactive, due to their light 
arn1ing and the fact they were scared by the murder of 10 Belgian peacekeepers.
54 
49 Richard Falk "The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United 
Nations" (1995) 36/2 Harv lnt ' LJ 34 1,356. 
50 Tom Masland, Joshua Hammer "Corpses Everywhere" ( 18 April 1994) Newsweek United States 
33; Marguerite Michaels "Descent into Mayhem" ( 18 April 1994) Time Magazine United States 44. 
51 Paul Lewis "2 Africa Leaders Die, UN Says: Rocket may ha ve Downed Plane" (7 April 1994) 
New York Times A I. 
52 Marguerite Michael s "Streets of Slaughter" (25 April 1994) Time Magazine United States 44. 
53 Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Rwanda (3 August 1994), UN Doc 
SI 1994/924. 
54 Fernando R Teson "Collective Humanitarian Intervention" (1996) 17 Mich J lnt' L 323,362. 
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By May 1994 the Secretary General called for a 5,500 all African troop under 
UNAMIR, but the Security Council was reluctant to authorise this plan, driven by 
critics of the United States;55 agreement could only be reached about the 
deployment of further 500 troops. 56 Finally in June 1994 objections to the 
deployment of more troops were dropped, but the mandate was restricted to 
protecting refugees and securing the delivery of aid-supplies.
57 In July 1994 France 
offered 2,500 troops . The Security Council authorised the instalment of these troops 
and found, in Resolution 929, a ' threat to peace and security in the region' and 
authorised the use of 'all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives', 
the common term to authorise the use of force. 58 The worst butchery stopped but the 
refugee disaster went on. Subsequently millions of Hutus fled to Zaire, afraid of 
revenge by Tutsis.59 Nevertheless, France withdrew once a new government was 
established, although it was an unstable one. The Secretary Generals calls for 
additional troops to safeguard refugee camps were rejected,
60 although occasional 
atrocities occured and disastrous conditions prevailed.
61 
The Security Council's reaction to the atrocities was slow and ineffective; it 
took nearly four months, till Resolution 929 was passed. They were even afraid of 
naming the slaughter what it was: genocide. Resolution 918 addressed "systematic, 
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law",
62 although a 
draft of this resolution contained the term 'genocide', but was dropped later on.
63 
55 Report of the Secretary General 011 the Situation in Rwanda ( 13 May 1994), UN Doc S/1994/565. 
56 SC Res 918, UN Doc S/RES/918 (1994). 
57 SC Res 925, UN Doc S/RES/925 ( 1994). 
58 SC Res 929, UN Doc S/RES/929 (1994). 
59 David van Biema "Exodus from Rwanda" (25 July 1994) Time Magazine United States 34; Kevin 
Fedarko "In Fear of a Nation's Revenge" (29 August 1994) Time Maga::.ine United States 56. 
60 "UN Force for Camps in Zaire is Doubtful" (1 January 1995) New York Times 1, 3. 
61 Joshua Hammer "Death Watch" (8 August 1994) Newsweek United States 14. 
62 SC Res 918, UN Doc S/RES/918 ( 1994). 
63 Joshua Hammer "The Killing Fields" (24 May 1994) Newsweek United States 46. 
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Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide defines genocide as: 64 
" ... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part;" 
The incidents in Rwanda seem to perfectly fit this definition and the slaughter 
seems to be one of the most obvious genocides beside the Cambodian killings by 
the Khmer Rouge after World War II. An United Nations expert commission 
ascertained later on, that "[t]hese acts of mass extermination against the Tutsi group 
as such constitute genocide within the meaning of artic le II of the [Genocide] 
Convention".65 One reason for the reticence to call it genocide may have been, that 
the Genocide Convention demands from the parties in Article I 'to undertake to 
prevent' this crime under international law,66 a measure the 'key players' in the 
Security Council were very reluctant to enforce. Rwanda might have been of far 
less interest for them to intervene militarily.67 On the other hand one shou ld not 
6
~ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, adopted by 
Resolution 260 (Ill) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, hereinafter Genocide 
Convention. 
65 Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council ( 4 October 1994), U 
Doc S/1994/1 125. 
66 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide I 948, adopted by 
Resolution 260 (Ill) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, hereinafter Genocide 
Convention; See also: Bruno Simma "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" (1999) 
European J lnt ' L 10 I, 3. 
67 See: Marguerite Michaels "Sorry, Wrong Country" (6 June 1994) Time Maga::.ine United States 
34. 
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forget that the Rwanda genocide took place shortly after the involvement in 
Somalia. This intervention was considered to be a disaster and was criticised for its 
military over humanitarian character. For that reason it is understandable that the 
UN members were very cautious not to make the same mistakes and therefore acted 
hesitantly. Nevertheless, Resolution 929 authorised the use of force by French 
troops,68 but again the Security Council was cautious enough to stress that the 
"situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case",69 anxious not to set a precedent. 
6 The Kosovo Crisis 
Kosovo is a part of former Yugoslavia, which is dominantly populated by 
ethnic Albanians. Nevertheless, the Serbs consider it their indigenous territory.
70 In 
1974 President Tito conceded the Albanians had autonomous status in Kosovo to 
f h · · 71 prevent uture et me nots. In 1991 nationalist Prime-Minister Slobodan 
Milosevic abolished this autonomy and drove the Albanians out of economic and 
political life. Meanwhile the Albanians established a nearly complete underground 
government and army in Kosovo. In 1997 the Albanians started to fight the Serbs, 
which not only used this situation to fight the armed forces but to banish the civilian 
population.72 Fearing a similar disaster to that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the 
EU, NATO and the UN had done nothing to prevent the genocide that took place, 
NATO considered military action.73 On 1 April 1998 the UN Security Council 
made Resolution 1160 but did not find any threat to international peace or security, 
which would have been necessary for the UN to take military action in relation to 
68 SC Res 929, UN Doc S/RES/929 ( 1994). 
69 SC Res 929, U Doc S/RES/929 ( 1994). 
70 news.bbc.co. uk <hllp ://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/hi/spec ial_report/ 1998/kosovo/ 110492.stm.> (last 
accessed 10 August 2003). 
71 G Richard Jansen ( 1999) "Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. An Abbreviated Hi story" 
http://lamar.colostate.edu/-grjan/kosovohi story.html > (last accessed 10 April 2003). 
72 Joachim Krause (2000) "Deutschland und die Kosovokrise". 
http ://www.dgap.org/texte/jk.kosovo.pdf> (last accessed JO April 2003). 
73 Joachim Krause Krause (2000) "Deutschland und die Kosovokrise". 
http ://www.dgap.org/texte/jkkosovo.pdf > (last accessed I O April 2003). 
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Kosovo later on.74 Russia rejected the use of force categorically. Meanwhile the 
Serbs proceeded with the displacement of ethnic Albanians. The NATO members 
r started to threaten the use of force. ) In September 1998 Sadako Ogata, the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, predicted a humanitarian disaster, because 270 
OOO Albanians were displaced.76 The UN Security Counci I issued another 
Resolution (1199), which now defined the situation m Kosovo as a ' threat for 
international peace and security' .77 However, Russia was still against the use of 
force, so the UN could not authorise military action. The Serbs started to withdraw 
their troops, but it did not turn out to be successful in the long term. 78 The 
Albanians used the withdrawal to seize formerly lost territory. In December 1998 
and January 1999 Belgrade decided to intervene in Kosovo with armed forces 
again. There were hints that the Serbs had developed a plan to displace the 
Albanians in a systematic manner. This was called "Operation Horseshoe".79 Even 
if the existence of such a plan is disputed now, the enormous speed of the ethnic 
cleansing was highly visible. 80 A last diplomatic effort was, the peace negotiations 
of Rambouillet, France (6 February 1999), failed and in March 1999 the ethnic 
cleansing continued. 81 In response, the NATO members began air strikes on 24 
March 1999 against targets in Kosovo and Yugoslavia.82 
74 SC Res I 160, UN Doc SIRES/I I 60 (1998). 
75 Ian Black "Nato plans Kosovo action" (7 July 1998) The Guardian London 12. 
76Kurt Schork, Paul Webster "Belgrade ' blocks food to Kosovo ' "(9 September 1998) 
The G11ardiw1 London 11. 
77 SC Res 1199, UN Doc S/RES/1199 ( 1998). 
78 Osce.org <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/overview/> (last accessed 10 April 2003). 
79 parliament. the-stationery-office.co. uk <http://www. par I iament. the-stationery-
office.co. u k/pa/cm I 99900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2811.htm > (last accessed I O April 2003). 
80 " Milosevic and Operation Horseshoe" ( 18 July 1999) The Observer London. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,2079 19,00.html > (last accessed I O April 2003); 
Guy Dinmore "V illagers Slaughtered in Kosovo 'Atroci ty' ; Scores Dead in Bloodiest Spree of 
Conflict" ( 17 January 1999) The Washington Post Washi ngton A I. 
81 parliament.the-stati onery-office.co. u k <http ://www. par! iament. the-stationery-office.co. uk/pa/ 
cmI99900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/34709.htm> (last accessed 10 April 2003). 
82 Nato.int <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> (last accessed 10 April 2003). 
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The legality of the intervention was highly disputed in the aftermath, because it 
was not authorised by the Security Council. However, after the event the Security 
Council drafted a resolution concerning the situation without mentioning the 
interference at all. 83 Some consider this as implicit toleration and therefore ex post 
de facto legal authorisation of the NATO intervention.84 This seemed to be based on 
moral endorsement rather then on legal considerations.85 Therefore it is no 
sufficient justification for intervention, regarding the fact that the threshold for use 
of force under the UN Charter is quite high. Hence explicit authorisation is needed. 
Given the lack of Security Council authorisation the only possible justification for 
the intervention can be found in customary international law. If such a doctrine 
exists will be examined below. 
7 The Cases of Iraq and Afghanistan 
Immediately after the ceasefire of the first Gulf War on 28 February 1991 
Kurds in the northern part and Shiites in the southern part of Iraq started an uprising 
against the Hussein regime. 86 The rebellion in the southern part was soon quelled, 
accompanied by brutal excesses against civilians, proved now by the finding of 
several mass graves and eyewitness accounts. 87 Afterwards Iraqi forces, mainly the 
notorious Republican Guard, concentrated on the Kurds. They were not only 
fighting rebels, but also committed systematic atrocities against civilians. 
Expulsion, poison gas attacks, air raids, and attacks against villages were on the 
agenda. 88 It is estimated that about 2,000 Kurds died per day .89 Massive flight 
83 SC Res 1244; UN Doc S/RES/1244 (June 1999). 
84 A Mark Weisburd " International Law and the Prob lem of Evil" (2001) 34 Vand J Transn L 225, 
232 - 233; uala Mole " Who Guards the Guard -The Rule of Law in Kosovo" (2001) 3 European 
Hum Ri ghts L Rev 280, 293. 
85 Peter Hilpold " Humanitarian Intervention: ls There a Need For a Legal Reappraisal?" (2001) 12 
European J lnt ' L 437, 440. 
86 Amir A Majid "lnternatioal Human Ri ghts and the Kurds" ( 1995) 2 Annual Survey lnt ' L & 
Comp L 53, 53 - 55. 
87 Susan Sachs "A Grim Graveyard Window in Hussein's Iraq" ( I June 2003) New York Times I, I. 
88 " Double Trouble for the Kurds (J April 1992) New York Times A 24. 
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towards Iran and Turkey started and thousands of Kurds found themselves trapped 
in the mountains due to the blocking of the border by Turkish troops.90 
On 5 April 1991 the Security Council issued resolution 688, addressing a threat 
to "international peace and security".91 Iraq was requested to stop the atrocities, but 
the resolution did not contain the phrase ' by all necessary means ', the explicit 
language-use to authorise the use of force. In contrast it expressively affi1med Iraq 's 
sovereignty and asked other countries not to breach it. Members of the Security 
Council were reluctant to use that expression, because they were afraid to set a 
precedent.92 After all, Iraq had a recognized and functioning government, unlike 
Somalia or Haiti. Authorising use of force would have meant an incursion on state 
sovereignty, as it was not in question that Iraq was not a failed state. Nevertheless 
did the United States, Britain, and France sent troops to the northern part of Iraq and 
established safe havens for the Kurds. 93 In the meantime, the UN took another 
approach and aiTanged the deployment of UN helpers and non-governmental relief 
agencies with the consent of Iraq.94 These two attempts clashed with each other as 
the allied troops wanted to withdraw very quickly and leave the relief groups 
behind, who therefore were adamant to consent with Iraq for their own safety.95 
However, after these struggles the Kurdish refugees were able to return to their 
homes, but subtle oppression in Iraq continued. 
89 Amir A Majid " lnternatioal Human Rights and the Kurds" ( 1995) 2 Annual Survey lnt ' L & 
Comp L 53, 55. 
90 Ron Mureau "Saddam's Slaughter" (15 April 1991 ) Newsweek United States 22. 
91 SC Res 688, UN Doc S/RES/688 ( 1991). 
92 Ruth E Gordon " Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti" ( 1996) 31 Tex lnt ' 
L J 43, 50. 
93 Douglas Eisner " Humanitarian Intervent ion in Post-Cold War Era" ( 1993) 11 Boston U lnt ' L J 
195,2 14. 
9
~ Agreement called 'Memorandum of Understanding' (18 April 1991), Annex to: Letter from the 
Secrewry General to the President of the Security Council (31 May 1991 ), UN Doc S/22663 ( 1991 ). 
95 Gleen Frankel "Relief Agencies Balk at US Enclave Plan; UN, Private Aid Groups Reluctant to 
Take Part Without Baghdad's Acquiescene" (25 April 1991) The Washington Post A 17. 
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Atrocities in the southern part also continued. Civilians were bombarded 
throughout the whole of March 1991 and Army Generals were ordered to wipe out 
whole tribes.96 The allied forces installed a no flight zone, which prevented further 
air raids, but not assaults on the ground. In 2003 the second Gulf War started. It was 
fought under the so-called 'war on terrorism' and humanitarian issues were 
addressed only from time to time. The British Government released a report 
containing the complete work of human rights violations of Iraq of the last couple 
of years and Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out the cruelty of the regime several 
times in the preliminary stages of the war. 97 United States President Bush also 
expressed his will to free the suppressed people of Iraq and addressed several 
human rights abuses and the ignorance of resolution 688, demanding a stop to these 
violations.98 In Resolution 1441 the Security Council recalled resolution 688 and 
diagnosed that Iraq "failed to comply with its commitments ... pursuant to 
Resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population".99 However, 
Resolution 1441 mainly dealt with the failure to comply with resolution 687, 
addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction. 100 It did not detennine a 
'threat to international peace and security' and contains therefore no authorisation 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Humanitarian concerns were no decisive 
factor for the attack, but only a side effect. 
96 Interims Report 011 the Situation of Hu111an Rights in Iraq , Annex to Letter fro111 Belgium to the 
U11ited Nations (5 August 1992), UN Doc S/24386 ( 1992). 
97 See for example: Tony Blair, Briti sh Prime Minister, "Speech to the Commons" (House of 
Commons, London , 18 March 2003), can be found at: 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/O, 12956,916790,00.html> (last accessed 28 July 2003); 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Britain Sadc/a111 Husse i11: Crimes and H11111w1 Rights Abuses 
(2 December 2002), can be found at: <http://www.fco.gov. uk/Files/kfi le/hrdossier.pdf> (last 
accessed 3 August 2003). 
98 George W Bush, President of the United State , "Speech to the United ations" (Uni ted Nations 
General Assembly, New York, 12 September 2002), can be found at: 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912- l .html> (last accessed 23 August 
2003). 
99 SC Res 1441 , U Doc SIRES/ 1441 (2002). 
100 See: SC Res 687, UN Doc S/RES/687 ( 1991 ). 
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The case in Afghanistan is similar, where severe breaches of human rights were 
not a deci sive factor for the attack of the United States and Britain in October 2002. 
Neverthe less the invasion ousted one of the most ruthless regimes: Since 26 
September 1996 Kabul was in the hands of the Taliban . They killed the former 
President Najibullah and put in place a rigid Islamic legal system. 101 By 1998 they 
controlled 90 per cent of the country and seized Mazar I Sharif, the former bastion 
of the Northern Alliance, until then the only remaining opponent of the Taliban. 102 
Suffering such as starvation and displacement went hand in hand with the war. 103 
The Taliban tortured and murdered civilians in occupied territories. 104 Massacres, 
abuses of women rights , and atrocities against other reli gious groups were 
widespread.105 Humanitarian concern was addressed in several Security Council 
Resolutions, 106 and in July 2001 the Security Council finally resolved in Resolution 
1363 that the situation constituted a ' threat to international peace and security' .107 
This threat, however, not only arose from violations of human ri ghts, but also from 
the extensive cultivation and traffic with opium, and most of all , from the 
harbouring and supporting of Al Qaeda. 108 It is most likely, that the last was the 
principal reason for describing the circumstances as a threat to peace and security. 
After the United States invasion in October 2001 the Security Council remained 
silent, only addressing in a press statement its deep concern "at the humanitarian 
101 "Afghan Militia Halts Advance After Kabu l" (29 September 1996) The Washington Post A 29. 
102 Dana Priest " Iran Poises Its Force On Afghan Border" (5 September 1998) The Washington Post 
A 1. 
103 See: Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan ( 17 September 1997), UN 
Doc S/1997/719; Report of the Secretary General 011 the Situation in Afghanistan ( 18 March 1998), 
U Doc S/1998/222. 
104 Interims Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Hum an Rights on the Situation 
011 Human Rights in Afghanistan (26 September 200 l ), UN Doc N56/409 ( 199 t ). 
105 Commission on Human Ri ghts Res 2000/18, Siwation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, UN Doc 
E/C N. 4/ RES/2 000/ l 8. 
106 SC Res 1267, UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999); SC Res 1333, UN Doc S/RES/1333 (2000). 
107 SC Res 1363, UN Doc S/RES/1333 (2001 ). 
108 See: Res 1363, UN Doc S/RES/1333 (200 l ). 
21 
situation m Afghanistan". 109 However, the United States' justification for the 
intervention was mainly self-defence. 
8 Liberia's Suffering 
In 1989 former member of the Liberian government Charles Taylor started a 
rebellion against the dictator Samuel Doe. 110 Taylor's National Patriotic Front 
(NPFL) soon conquered large parts of the country and pushed back the opponent 
into Monrovia. Fighting against Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was 
accompanied by cruel slaughter of civilians. 111 A third force entered the conflict, 
the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL) of Prince Johnson, which 
aggravated the situation. Tribes supported different groups' 12 and numerous splinter 
groups formed: until 1995 about six major warring fractions occupied parts of the 
country and fought each other. 113 Approximately 750,000 people fled the country, 
over one million were regarded as displaced within the country, and about 200,000 
died. The Liberian population at that time was estimated at 2,5 million. 114 
Soon after the civil war broke out the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) considered intervening in the conflict. It established an 
ECOW AS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and troops entered Liberia in 
August 1990, soon gaining control over Monrovia and installing an interim 
govemment. 115 However, ECOMOG became famous for stealing and looting. 116 
109 Press State111ellt on Terrorist Threats by the Securiry Council President (8 October 200 l ), UN 
Doc SC/7167 (2001). 
110 Levi Woodward "Taylor's Liberia and UN Involvement" (2003) 19 N Y L Sch Human Rights 
923, 926 - 927. 
111 Kenneth B oble "Masses of Liberian Refugees Flee Rebellion and Reprisal Killings" (31 
January 1990) New York Times A l. 
11 2 Kenneth B Noble "From Liberian War, Tales of Brutality" (9 July 1990) New York Times A 3. 
11 3 Binaifer Nowrojee "Joinnign Forces: United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping - Lessons from 
Liberia" (1995) 8 Harv Human Rights J 129, 133. 
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Liberia" ( 1995) 8 Harv Human Rights J 129, 134. 
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However, its involvement made it possible for humanitarian aid to reach suffering 
people. 11 7 
Nevertheless Taylor remained in control over most parts of the country. 118 No 
less then 12 unsuccessful cease-fire agreements were negotiated till 1995.119 United 
Nations involvement was at first minor, ECOW AS involvement was appreciated, 
but it continued its passive attitude. 120 By the end of 1992, in the light of continuing 
fighting, the atrocities against civilians, and the refugee disaster, the Security 
Council determined in Resolution 788 that the situation constituted a " threat to 
international peace and security". 121 It installed an observer mission in Liberia, 
UNOMIL, in 1993.122 Finally, in August 1995, another cease-fire agreement, the 
'Abuja Accord', was signed under the auspices of ECOW AS and was recognised by 
United Nations. 123 This ceasefire lasted only a couple of weeks. 124 Civilians 
suffered further from rebel troop encroachments; they killed for food, raped, and 
murdered at random. 125 In August 1996 the 'Abuja Accords' were re-established 
and Charles Taylor was elected as President. 126 
11 6 Jushua Hammer " Into Anarchy" (29 April 1996) Newsweek United States 39. 
11 7 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (9 January 
1995), UN Doc S/1995/9. 
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126 Levi Woodward "Taylor 's Liberia and UN Involve ment" (2003) 19 N Y L Sch Human Ri ghts 
923, 930 - 931. 
23 
However, peace remained illusive. Occasional fighting within Liberia 
continued, mostly accompanied by a large number of child soldiers. 127 The Taylor 
regime supported the destabilization of neighbouring countries, such as Sierra 
Leone, Ivory Coast, and Guinea. 128 In recent times, one rebel force, Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), gained strength in Liberia and 
was able to gain control of considerable parts of the country and began to seize 
Monrovia. 129 The numbers of refugees increased again and people also fled from 
the Ivory Coast to Liberia, trying to escape the civil war in their country. 130 350,000 
are displaced around Monrovia. Rape, violence, and killing were widespread. 131 
After another unsuccessful cease-fire agreement on 17 June 2003 the Liberians 
called desperately for United States help. Nevertheless the United States was 
reluctant to take the lead in a peacekeeping mission. 132 Meanwhile fierce fighting in 
Monrovia killed hundreds of civilians. 133 On l August 2003 Security Council 
Resolution 1497 determined a "threat to international peace and security" and 
authorised the establishment of a multinational force to implement the cease-fire 
agreement from 17 June 2003. 134 Nigeria agreed to send 1,500 troops under control 
of UNOMIL. 135 After Taylor left the country the United States deployed 200 troops, 
but left the main responsibility to African troops in the hands of UNOMIL. 136 The 
current situation is that the United States withdrew their 200 troops, leaving the 
127 Danie l Ei se nberg "Who will Stop the Killing?" (4 August 2003) Time Magazine United States 32. 
128 J Stephen Morri son "A Rare Chance for Change" (28 July 2003) Newsweek United States 20. 
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concerning Liberia (5 August 2003), UN Doc S/2003/793. 
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African troops behind,137 who tried to disarm the country. An interim government 
was installed. 138 
9 Destabilized Democratic Republic of Congo 
In 1997 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(ADFL) under the Leadership of Laurent Kabila seized power in Zaire. Long-
standing dictator Mobutu Sese Seko fled the country; Kabila became President, and 
renamed Zaire into Democratic Republic of Congo. 139 The Tutsi dominated 
Rwandan government supported Kabila. However, his government could not 
establish a stabilized system and was unwilling to recognize human rights. The 
western part was still destabilized by Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Rwandan 
and Ugandan Tutsi dominated troops were present in the country, committing 
atrocities against Hutus. 140 
Kabila turned against his former allies and started to co-operate with the Hutu 
militia. Congolese Tutsi forces now turned towards the Ugandan and Rwandan 
forces and in 1998 a second civil war broke out, accompanied by severe atrocities 
against civilians. Rwanda, Burundi , and Uganda supported the rebelling warring 
fractions, while Kabila was supported by Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, and 
Namibia .141 A statement of the President of the Security Council determined a 
' threat to regional peace and security' .142 On 10 July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement was signed by the warring fractions , strongly demanded and supported 
137 " Marines Leave Monrovia after I O Days Deployment" (25 August 2003) Washington Times A 
14. 
138 Tim Weiner " Interim Liberian Government Head Named" (21 August 2003) New York Times A 
8. 
139 See: www.MONUC.<org http://www.monuc.org/HistoryEn.aspX>; (last accessed 28 October 
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by the United Nations. 143 Further on the United Nations deployed liaison personnel 
to help to implement the ceasefire agreement. In the following months the Security 
Council expanded the mandate further on and finally deployed the United ations 
Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 144 
However, MONUC had no authorisation to intervene by the use of force. 
The ceasefire agreement remained unsuccessful. 145 Foreign troops refused to 
withdraw, rebel troops continued fighting, the refugee situation became worse, and 
the Security Council emphasized a 'threat to international peace and security' .146 In 
the meantime Laurent Kabila was assassinated. He was succeeded by his son Joseph 
Kabila. Nevertheless, fighting went on in different regions of the country, 
massacres against civilians occurred, and large numbers of child soldiers were 
involved in the combats. 147 However, MONUC had minor success in the 
withdrawal of official foreign troops ,148 but by the end of 2002 rebel fighting in the 
eastern and north-eastern region intensified. 149 Another peace deal was signed, but 
remained once again unsuccessful. 150 Atrocities against civilians became more 
143 SC Res 1234 (1999), UN Doc S/RES/1234; Report of the Secretary General 011 the United 
Natio11s Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo ( 15 July 1999), U Doc 
Sll999!790 ;Lener from the Permanellf Representative of Zambia to the United Nations (23 Jul y 
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severe. Rape, cannibalism, and mass slaughter were reported.151 In the four years of 
war an estimated three million civilians were killed. 152 
The United Nations Secretary General proposed to deploy combat-ready 
multinational troops in the worst affected region Bunia, Ituri. 153 In this area 
thousands of civilians were abused and slaughtered. 154 Finally the European Union 
agreed to provide troops with France as the framework nation . In Resolution 1484 
the Security Council authorised the deployment this emergency force, allowing "to 
take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate". 155 Thi s mandate was to pacify the 
region till 30 September 2003. Afterwards MONUC should have taken command 
and carried out its mission defi ned in previous Resolutions. 156 However, the 
European led force could stop the worst atrocities, but occasional massacres by 
rebel troops still continued. 157 
15 1Human Ri ghts Watch Report "Covered in Blood: Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC" 
(8 Jul y 2003), can be found at: <http://hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703-
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B Human Rights and Their Protection 
The purpose of Human Rights is to protect Individuals . This questions in how 
far individuals are legal entities under international law. Following the positivist 
point of view, which dominated the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century, only states are recognised subjects under international law.158 
The growing number of Human Rights Treaties, Declarations and Conventions, 
however, shows the growing recognition of individuals. This demonstrates , that 
individuals at least are increasingly recognised as subjects under international 
law.1 59 
One of the first Convention concerning human rights beside the Convention 
dealing with rights during war times, was the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide drafted in 1948. It states in Artic le I: 'The 
contracting parties confirm that genocide, ... , is a crime under international law 
which they undertake to prevent". 160 The same year the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was drafted by the General Assembly. 161 Other important agreements 
are, inter alia, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 162 the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities ,163 or the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women. 164 In 1987 the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment entered into 
158 Malcolm N Shaw lntemational Law (411, Eel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 182 
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force. The participating states recognise, " that those rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person". 165 This is expressed in similar words in the other 
Conventions and Declarations as well and reflects the preamble of the United 
Nations Charter, which determined: " to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights , 
in the dignity and worth of the human person". However, these Conventions and 
Declarations do not authorise states to intervene in other states affairs if in breach 
with this rules , but stipulates the participating states to take measures against such 
abuses or to punish such atrocities. 
In 1992 the General Assembly drafted the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. Although Dec larations are not legally 
binding, they have high moral weight under international law and give guidelines 
how to interpret it. 166 The Declaration reads in Article l (2): 167 
lt constitutes a violation of the rules of international Jaw guaranteeing, inter 
ali a, the ri ght to recognition as a person before the Jaw, the right to liberty and security 
of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other crue l, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. It also violates or consti tutes a grave threat to the 
right to life. 
This at least proves that there is no more doubt about the status of individuals as 
recognised entities under international law . Also notable is Article 2 (2) of the 
Dec laration stating, "States shall act at the national and regional leve ls and in 
cooperation with the United Nations to contribute by a ll means to the preventi on 
and eradication of enforced disappearance." 168 That states should ac t on a regional 
leve l to prevent such disappearances is a clear push bac k of state sovereignty in 
favour of human ri ghts. 
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A/47/49. 
168 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances ( I 992), UN Doc 
A/47/49. 
One further proof for the increasing awareness of the responsibility to protect 
basic human rights is the establishment of the International Criminal Court. In 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute the crimes, which are within the jurisdiction of the 
Court are listed as they are: Genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes, and 
crime of aggression. 169 Even the Security Council addressed in all Resolutions 
mentioned above their concern about the breach of human rights. 170 All this 
indicates the willingness to counter human rights abuses and the already decreasing 
significance of the former absolute doctrine of state sovereignty. Finally, in a report 
of the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty it is stated: 
171 
" Where a population is sufferin g serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling to halt and 
avert it , the principle of non-interventi on yie lds to the responsibility to protect." 
C Conclusion 
The described cases all have something in common: humanitarian concerns 
were at stake. All conflicts provided lethal consequences for civilians up to severe 
Genocide. However, causes and responses are various. The causes can roughly be 
separated into abuses committed by a criminal and authoritarian government against 
its people and those committed by rebel groups or outside forces in a destabilized 
country. In all trouble spots intervention by outside forces took place. Intervening 
powers were either single countries, international bodies like NATO or ECOWAS, 
coalition forces backed by the United Nations, coalition forces without backing, or 
the United Nations by itself. 
169 Rome Stalllte of the International Criminal Court ( 1998), UN Doc NCO F.183/9. 
170 For example: SC Res 775, UN Doc S/RES/775 (1992); SC Res 841, Un Doc S/RES/841 (1993); 
SC Res 918, UN Doc S/RES/918 (1994); SC Res 1199, UN Doc S/RES/1199(1998); SC Res 688, 
UN Doc S/RES/688 (1991); SC Res 1497, U Doc S/RES/1497 (2003). 
171 The Responsibility to Protect (December 200 I) Report of the International Commission of 
Intervention and State Sovereignty. 
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This questions m how far a duty to intervene anses. The Intervention in 
Cambodia was highly criticised, even humanitarian abuses like the ongomg 
Genocide were not recognised as justification. However, this changed in the later 
cases. The international community tolerated Tanzanians action in Uganda. Since 
Somalia the United Nations has determined in all cases a 'threat to international 
peace and security' or at least a 'threat to peace and security in the region '. 
However, how to respond remained unclear and non-uniform for several reasons. 
After the Somalia incidence the United Nations seemed to be afraid to get in the 
same kind of disaster and reacted hesitantly. Further on some regions are obviously 
of more interest for those states that have the power to intervene. Another striking 
feature is that authorisation of intervention is more dependant of how strong and 
stable the opposed government is, rather than on the kinds of abuses committed. In 
Haiti the atrocities were less severe than in Iraq in 1991 , but Resolution 940 
allowed the use of force explicitly while Resolution 688 did not. 
The fear to infringe upon the old and strong doctrine of 's tate sovereignty' is 
obvious. As already stated above, the members of the Security Council or the 
intervening parties were always cautious to point out the unique situation, although 
it is hard to not see similarities at all in the different cases. This will be addressed in 
more detail later on in this paper. However, right now it is important to point out 
that the United Nations are increasingly willing to address lethal human rights 
abuses and they even see a duty to do so. 172
 While doing this, the responsible bodies 
recognise individual human beings as protected entities under international law, at 
least when it comes to lethal consequences for the threatened people. The increasing 
number of Treaties and Conventions concerning human rights also support this 
view. When doing so, however, the same standards have to apply for everybody. It 
cannot be that people under one regime are less protected than under another. The 
establishment of the International Criminal Court also shows the willingness to 
172 See: Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, U Doc 
S/24111 ( 1992); Report of the Secretary General 011 the Work of the Organisation ( 13 September 
1991), UN Doc N46/I (1991). 
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punish certain acts. The punishable offence is defined by the act, rather than by who 
committed the act. 
A duty can be separated into a legal and a moral one. At first only a possible 
moral duty is under scrutiny. As already pointed out the protection of human rights 
of individuals has become a new area of international law. The most recent step was 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court. State sovereignty is already 
not an absolute doctrine anymore. Although the reactions to human right abuses are 
various and the responsible bodies seem to be uncertain how to react, there are, at 
least, attempts to address severe atrocities. These were driven by the consolidation 
of human rights as part of protected international law. It can be determined, that 
nowadays every severe human rights abuse that is comparable to the cases above 
causes a reaction by the United Nations. On the other hand rights remain a toothless 
tiger if there is no possibility to enforce them. Again, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court proves that if a punishment system for certain crimes 
exists it is only logical , that the prevention of such acts must be a goal as well. 
So a moral duty to react to severe human rights abuses such as the ones 
punishable under the Rome Statute arises by recent practise of the international 
community and by the strengthening of human rights in international law in the past 
decades. That the United Nations also assumes such a moral duty exists can be 
derived from the comments of the Secretary General, who stated in 1991: "It is now 
increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic 
jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human 
rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity" and that it 
would be false, if "sovereignty, even in this days and age, includes the right of mass 
slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of 
civilian populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection."
173 A 
statement of the European Council to the United Nations in 1999 concerning the 
Kosovo also expresses that such a moral duty of the international community is on 
173 Report of rhe Secrerary General on rhe Work of rhe Organisation ( 13 September 1991 ), U Doc 
N46/l (1991). 
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the rise: "We ... are under a moral obligation that indiscriminate behaviour and 
violence ... are not repeated .... An aggressor must know that he will be punished." 174 
However, it became obvious that most interventions not carried out in consent, 
were disputed. Another disadvantage of this is a lack of coordination, which can 
even endanger humanitarian missions and therefore be counterproductive. The Iraq 
case of 1991 is such an example, were military involvement and humanitarian relief 
were not mutually agreed. Another dilemma so far seems the intervention by forces 
not from the region. The Somalia intervention became a disaster, inter alia, because 
of a lack of knowledge about the complicated situation within the country and the 
non-understanding of the warlord and tribes system. On the other hand the sole 
intervention by regional entities seemed to be disadvantageous as well. In Liberia, 
for example, ECOMOG troops were involved in human rights abuses.
175 Therefore 
the Security Council finally shifted to a more international solution rather than 
trusting in a regional one. Further on regional interventions were mostly driven by 
own interests rather than by honest humanitarian concerns or at least these concerns 
were just marginal release. A combination of regional and more international 
solutions seems to be desirable. The reference to humanitarian abuses by a regime 
was often used as additional argument for intervention, but the way it was carried 
out showed that it was not a main concern. This shows that humanitarian 
intervention is still flawed by a lack of rules concerning how to carry it out. 
III HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE UN CHARTER 
Obviously the Security Council got increasingly involved in intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. It is worthwhile to take a closer look on how this might be 
legitimized under international agreements and the UN Charter. It is also necessary 
to scrutinize the Security Council's determination of humanitarian catastrophes and 
its different approaches to react to these. 
174 Letter of the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, UN Doc S/ 1999/342. 
175 See: Levi Woodward "Taylor's Liberia and U Involvement" (2003) 19 N Y L Sch Human 
Rights 923, 931. 
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A Use of Force under the UN Charter 
In genera l the use of force is prohibited under the UN Charter as stated in 
Article 2 (4).
176 
Article 2 (7) protects state sovereignty in stating that the United 
Nations are not authorised to "intervene in matters which are essential within the 
jurisdiction of any state". Within the United Nations Charter on ly Chapter VII 
allows to authorise the use of force in exemption to Article 2 (4). The responsible 
body is the Security Council. Article 42 allows the Security Council to take such 
means 'necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security' after non-
forceful measures subject to Article 41 turned out to be insufficient. As an own UN 
Force under Chapter VII was never established, the Security Council delegates 
responsibility to member states, subject to Article 53. Anyway Article 53 states 
preference for settlement within a local framework.
177 A prime example is the 
support of ECOWAS involvement in Liberia. 
According to Article 39, however, it is essential to determine a ' threat to 
peace' and practise during the last decades shows that use of force was only 
indisputably authorised, when addressed explicitly in using phrases like 'by all 
necessary means' or in giving detailed guidelines about structure, command, and 
competence of the force. 178 Although Article 39 does not refer to 'international 
peace' it is undisputed that this is a precondition.
179 This can also be deduced from 
Article l in general, referring to "international peace", and Article 2 (7) in special, 
forbidding intervening in domestic affairs. Further on Article 24 (1) describes the 
function of the Security Council as to be responsible "for the maintenance of 
176 See detailed: Ingrid Detter The Law of War (2nd Ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000) 62 - 65. 
177 Article 53 (2) of the Charter: 'The Members of the United Nations entering into such 
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of 
local di sputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring 
them to the Security Council' 
178 See for example: SC Res 678, UN Doc S/RES/678 (1990). 
179 See for further reference: Tania Yoon "Closing the Gab Between Legitimacy and Legality of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo" (2002) 7 UCLA J Int' L Foreign 
Aff31, 38. 
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international peace". 18
0 It is noticeable, that there is no explicit authorisation for 
intervention on humanitarian grounds mentioned. However, authorisation by the 
Security Council is the most legitimate and least disputed measure concerning the 
use of force and is therefore most desirable. The Interventions in Liberia, Congo, 
Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia were possibly criticised, but their legality was not 
seriously questioned compared with the unauthorised interventions in Cambodia, 
Iraq, and Kosovo. 
B Threat to International Peace and Security 
The Intervention of Tanzania in Uganda was the last one where the Security 
Council did not assess a threat to international or regional peace and security. 
Although according to the Charter this determination is a precondition to authorise 
the use of force, not in every case was the use of force finally authorised. However, 
in every Resolution human rights violations were the main concern. In Resolution 
1484 regarding the situation in the Congo, the Security Council expressed its 
concern at the ongoing "fighting as well as the gravity of the humanitarian 
situation". 181 In the case of Liberia the Security Council stressed out its concern at 
" the conflict in Liberia and its effects on the humanitarian situation, including the 
tragic loss of countless innocent lives, in that country, and its destabilizing effect on 
the region" 182 Nevertheless Resolution 1497 addressed also a threat for peace 
within Liberia, beside stability for sub-region West Africa .
183 
In fact, these two 
cases are the only ones where the effects on the region were indeed grave. The 
whole Great Lakes region became destabilized and in Liberia the surrounding 
countries were strongly involved in aggravating the situation. 
The slaughter in Rwanda had its effects on neighboring states as well, but the 
states were not involved actively like in the cases above. The Security Council 
strongly concentrated on the humanitarian crisis when eventually authorizing the 
180 UN Charter Article 24. 
181 SC Res 1484, UN Doc S/RES/1484 (2003). 
182 SC Res 1497, UN Doc S/RES/1497 (2003). 
183 SC Res 1497, UN Doc S/RES/1497 (2003). 
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use of force.
184 
Also it emphasized the "unique case" demanding immediate 
action .
185 
To point out the uniqueness shows, in a way, the struggle of the Security 
Council to bring the use of force in line with state sovereignty. Nevertheless the 
Security Council stressed out that the " magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in 
Rwanda constitutes a threat to international peace and security." 186 So the 
humanitarian crisis constituted the threat and did not cause a threat or was caused 
by a threat. 
In the case of Kosovo and Somalia the threat to international peace was minor. 
Nevertheless the Security Council determined in Resolution 775 concerning the 
situation in Somalia that it was a threat to international peace and security.
187 
However, this threat was not specified within the Resolution, but the humanitarian 
crisis was addressed five times, including how to carry out humanitarian relief.
188 
That the humanitarian catastrophe was the reason for intervention became obvious 
with Resolution 794: It demanded stepping in to maintain humanitarian deliverance. 
It also stated, that the "human tragedy" and the prevention of " humanitarian 
assistance" constitutes a " threat to international peace and security". 189 Logically, 
the Security Council also stressed the " unique character of the situation" and its 
"extraordinary nature" and therefore called for an "exceptional response".
190 
Precedence shall be prevented under all circumstances. In the Resolution 
concerning the situation in Kosovo again the effect on surrounding countries by the 
wave of refugees was emphasized, 191 although these effects were secondary 
regarding the threat to peace. Effected countries were, for example, Germany, 
France, Italy and Austria, all stable states, which were not threatened by the 
refugees. In Albania the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
184 See: SC Res 929, U Doc S/RES/929 (1994). 
185 SC Res 929, UN Doc S/RES/929 ( 1994). 
186 SC Res 929, U Doc S/RES/929 (1994). 
187 SC Res 775, UN Doc S/RES/775 ( 1992). 
188 See: SC Res 775, UN Doc S/RES/775 ( 1992). 
189 SC Res 794, UN Doc S/RES/794 ( 1992). 
190 SC Res 794, UN Doc S/RES/794 ( 1992). 
19 1 SC Res 1199, UN Doc S/RES/1199 (1998). 
(OSCE) was involved since 1997,192 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995. 193 
With regard to the content, the Resolution deals exclusively with the refugee 
d. . h. h K 194 1saster wit m t e osovo. The reference to the threat to international peace only 
seemed to be driven by the lack of other means than by a real fear for international 
peace. 
Finally in the cases of Iraq and Haiti this threat did not exist at all. The 
Security Council emphasized in Resolution 688 the consequences for the region 
caused by the refugee disaster: "the repression ... led to a massive flow of refugees 
towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which 
threaten international peace and security" 195 In fact did Iran and Turkey blocked 
their borders successfully. A massive flow of refugees towards international borders 
took place, but not so much across international borders. Therefore to revert to 
emphasising the threat to other countries seems more like avoiding addressing the 
true reason for drafting the Resolution: the humanitarian disaster. 196 In the case of 
Haiti the only threatened country in regard to refugees was the United States. It is 
unlikely that these refugees threatened the peace and freedom of the United States. 
Nevertheless the Security Council authorised the use of force.
197 
A further conspicuousness is the fact that the Security Council did not authorise 
the use of force when addressing a ' threat to international peace and security' in 
every case, although other measures turned out to be insufficient.
198 It is easy to 
192 See: www.OSCE.org, <http://www.osce.org/albania/overviewl>, ( last accessed 10 November 
2003). 
193 www.OSCEBlH.org, <http://www.oscebih .org/miss ion/themission.asp>, (la t accessed 10 
November 2003. 
194 SC Res 1199, UN Doc SIRES/ 1199 ( 1998) . 
195 See: SC Res 688, UN Doc S/RES/687 ( 1991 ). 
196 Richard B Lilli ch "The Role of the U Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis 
Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post Cold War World" ( 1995) 3 Tulane J lnt' & 
Comp L l , 6-7. 
197 SC Res 940, UN Doc S/RES/940 ( 1994). 
198 Compare for example Kosovo, lraq, and Somalia, Congo. 
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recognize that this difference is not caused by the kind or severity of human rights 
abuses. Compared with the atrocities against Kurds in Iraq the violations of human 
rights in Haiti were minor, nevertheless only in the case of Haiti was the use of 
force explicitly authorised. It is obvious that the stronger and more stable a 
government is, the more reluctant the Security Council is to authorise the use of 
force. 
C Conclusion 
The Security Council shifted from rejecting intervention on humanitarian 
grounds through tacit approval towards explicit authorisation. The protection of 
basic human rights came into focus of the Council. However, the Council has only 
one means to take action. It has to determine a threat to international peace and 
security. However, the analysis above proved that the determination of a 'threat to 
international peace and security' was dependant on the humanitarian crisis within a 
state, rather than on the effect on surrounding countries. It is said that the Security 
Council has some flexibility in determining what constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security and that history taught that violation of human rights can cause 
instability of a region. 199 Certainly it is true that the Security Council has a wide 
discretionary power and that in some cases surely instability occurred as determined 
above. On the other hand these threats did not seem to be the cause for intervention . 
In fact the Council increasingly involved itself in internal conflicts.
200 The Council 
risks breaching Article 2 (7) and therefore losing its authority. Further more it puts 
its ability to react ~o humanitarian crisis at risk: If the Security Council has to follow 
its self set guidelines it is not able to authorise intervention when there cannot be 
made even the slightest argument, that the situation has an international impact. 
Further on the Security Council is obviously in a dilemma regarding state 
sovereignty. This led in the past to an unequal treatment of humanitarian disasters, 
199 Tania Yoon "Closing the Gab Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo" (2002) 7 UCLA J lnt ' L Foreign Aff 31, 38. 
200 See also:David M Malone "The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study in the 
Creative Interpretation of the UN Charter" (2003) 35 NYUJ lnt' L & Pol 487, 490 - 492. 
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disadvantageous for maltreated people in a strong and stable country. Nevertheless 
it seemed in recent decades willing to limit this doctrine in favour of human rights. 
Within the whole United Nations this willingness increases. In 1991 the Secretary 
General commented on that: 201 
"It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential 
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity" 
The Security Council followed that thread in 1992 when noting that not only 
military conflicts between states but also instability in humanitarian fields constitute 
a threat to international peace and security 202 and in a Report from the Secretary 
General in 1992 the threat by refugees and displaced persons was pointed out.
203 
Recent developments prove that such limitation of state sovereignty is already 
coming into force under international law. The Secretary General stated in 1999: 
"State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined .... States are now 
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their people, and not vice 
versa. "204 
Even if the Security Council explicitly authorised the use of force in the past, 
some disadvantages and shortcomings occurred. In the case of Rwanda the reaction 
was far too hesitant. Intervention in Somalia took its time as well and was 
eventually characterised by lack of planning, chaotic enforcement, and lack of 
understanding of the regional situation. Also of negative impact was the growing 
difference between the United Nations and the leading power of the Somalia 
intervention, the United States.205 Unclear distribution of authority led to the 
development of different aims, counterproductive to carrying out the main targets of 
201 Report of the Secretary General 011 the Work of the Organisation ( 13 September l 991), U Doc 
A/46/1 (1991). 
202 SCOR 47111 Session, 3046 meeting, UN Doc S/PV.3046 (1992). 
203 Age11 da for Peace: Preventive Dip/0111acy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc S/24111 
( 1992). 
204 Kofi Annan "Two Concepts of Sovereignty" ( 18 September 1999) The Economist United States. 
205 See in detail : Chester A Crocker "The Lessons of Somalia; Not Everything Went Wrong" (May/ 
June 1995) Foreign Afr, Comments l. 
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the operation.
206 
This was similar in the Iraq case in 1991 although the conflict 
between the intervening parties was more obvious, as the Security Council even did 
not authorise the use of force. 
Even regarding Haiti, several months elapsed until intervention was authorised. 
Several ineffective embargos were imposed and false promises made by the militia 
rulers.
207 
The UN Charters demands in Article 40, 41 to take other measures than 
the use of force beforehand. This is definitely not to be criticised as the use of force 
is , and should be, under all circumstances the absolute. On the other hand lives are 
at stake, therefore a more comprehensive framework, which would enable faster 
decision-making, is necessary. Another reason for the slowness of reaction is the 
lack of the United Nations own military means. The system depends on the 
willingness of states to send troops and to provide a military command staff.
208 
This proves the shortcomings of a system originally not created for humanitarian 
intervention. The lack of such a system also eventually leads to a neglect of 
preventive measures in the preliminary stages of a rising crisis. The scrutinized 
cases all show this neglect and are characterised by inconsistent reaction in the early 
stages.209 The efforts often appear like a patchwork: general Security Council 
Resolutions; involvement of regional organisations, expressly supported by the 
United Nations or tacitly tolerated; establishment of observer missions; 
establishment of special missions. 
For sure authorisation by the Security Council is the most legitimate and 
desirable one. Meanwhile we have to face the fact that state sovereignty is no more 
206 See: Chester A Crocker "The Lessons of Somalia; ot Everything Went Wrong" (May / June 
1995) Foreign Afr, Comments 1. 
207 DJ Lecce "International Law Regarding Pro-Democratic Intervention: A Study of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti" ( 1998) 45 Naval L Rev 247, 255. 
208 See: Michael Rei sman "Peacemaking" ( 1993) 18 Yale J lnt ' L 415 , 422. 
209 See: Kofi Annan "Two Concepts of Sovereignty" (18 September 1999) The Economist United 
States. 
40 
an absolute doctrine.
210 
Human rights increasingly gain importance. They even gave 
reason for intervention. Nevertheless the Security Council has to address a threat to 
international peace and security, rather then the abuses within the country. This 
seemed to be driven more by the necessity to fall back to this tool, because no other 
exists, then by the fit, and this creates the already mentioned disadvantages. 
IV HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW 
Definite justification for humanitarian intervention can be gained by Security 
Counci 1 authorisation. However, in the last decades interventions took place 
without or at least unclear authorisation. Obviously there also 1s no general 
principle of humanitarian intervention under international law, as proved by the 
controversies after unauthorised interventions. This questions how far humanitarian 
intervention might be already legal under customary international law. Especially 
after the Kosovo intervention by NATO a widespread discussion about that issue 
started. 
A State of Necessity 
One link for humanitarian intervention could be the rules of 'state of necessity' 
under the 'Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts ' adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) at its fifty-third session 
2001-21 1 State of necessity is a defence to otherwise injurious and illegal acts.
212 
Article 25 states:213 
Necessity may not be invoked by a State ... unless the act: (a) ls the only way for 
the State to safeg uard an essential inte rest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) 
Does not seriously impair an essential interest of a State ... or the international 
community as a whole." 
210 See also: Thomas Frank "The Emerging Ri ght to Democratic Governance" (l 992) 86 Am J Int' L 
46, 85. 
211 UN Doc NCN.4/L.602/Rev.l (26July2001). 
212 George E Walker " Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor other Countries' 
lmperiled Indigenous Nationals" (2002) 18 AU lnt' L Rev 35, 49. 
213 UN Doc NCN.4/L.602/Rev. I (26 July 2001). 
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Some considered this to legitimize intervention on an international levei.214 
Essential interests must be at stake and there must be a grave and imminent peril , 
which, however, does not mean, that the very existence of a state need be 
threatened.
2 15 According to the ILC it is not even necessary that interests of a 
certain state be at stake. It is sufficient if essential interest of the international 
community as a whole a threatened. 216 However, it is not generally acknowledged, 
that a doctrine of necessity exists under international law.217 Nevertheless, recent 
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledge the existence of 
's tate of necessity ' under international law and refer to commentaries of the ILC.21
8 
But even if we recognize a doctrine of necessity we face some problems: On the 
one hand we need a wrongful act under Article 1, which can be a breach of an 
obligation , regarding to Article 12.219 These can be seen in breac hes of human 
rights treaties. The ILC states: "Thus State Responsibility extends, for example, to 
h . h . 1 . " -no uman ng ts v10 at1ons .--
Another question however is whether breaches can be answered by use of 
force. The ILC states: 221 
214 George E Walker "Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor other Countries ' 
lmperiled Indigeno us ationals" (2002) 18 AU lnt ' L Rev 35, 160. 
215 See detailed: Roman Boed "State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful 
Conduct" (2000) 3 Yale H R & Dev L J I, 15 - 20 . 
216 "Commentaries on the draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts" 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53d session, 195 , UN Doc N56/IO. 
2 17 Lan Brownlie /11temational Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford Universi ty Press, Oxford, 
1963) 247. 
2 18 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hun gary v Slovakia) LCJ Rep 1997, 7, 39 -
44. 
2 19 UN Doc NCN.4/L.602/Rev. l (26 July 2001). 
220 "Comme ntaries on the draft articles on Responsibility of States fo r internationally wrongful acts" 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53d sess ion , 2 14, UN Doc N56/l0. 
22 1 "Commentaries on the draft articles on Responsibility of States fo r internationally wrongful acts" 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53d session, 204, U Doc N56/IO. 
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This has a particular importance in relation to the rules relating to the use of 
force in international relations and to the question of Military necess ity. It is true that in 
a few case , the plea of necessity has been invoked to excuse military action abroad, in 
particular in the context of claims to humanitarian intervemion. The question whether 
measures of forcible humanitarian intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters 
V[I or VIII of the Charter of the United ations, may be lawful under modern 
international law is not covered by article 25. 
To bring into play the 'Draft articles on the Responsibility of States' to justify 
humanitarian intervention means also to consider the comments of the ILC 
concerning the relevant articles. The ILC stated clearly, that humanitarian 
intervention is not within the scope of Article 25. To conclude, that a custom of 
state of necessity based on the draft articles immanently includes justification for 
the use of force to bring human rights abuses to an end is therefore contradictory. 
Interference could be than just based on 'emergency help' for the effected 
people. 222 As this is not enshrined in the UN Charter, it has to be derived from an 
analogous application of Article 51.223 This however is against the purpose of 
Article 51 to provide a narrow and strict framework for the legality of self-defence. 
Therefore a strict interpretation of Article 51 does not allow such a conclusion.2'.!
4 
Further argument against such an analogous application can be found in the roots of 
Article 51: It codified the already existing right of self-defence under customary 
international law. 'Emergency help' for individuals however has no roots in 
customary law. To derive it from Article 51 would contradict the aim of this Article 
to narrow down the legality of use of force instead of widening it. 
222 Peter Hilpold "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need For a Lega l Reappraisa l?" (2001) 12 
European J lnt' L 437, 445. 
223 Peter Hilpold "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need For a Legal Reapprai sa l?" (2001) 12 
European J lnt ' L 437, 445. 
224 See: Peter Hilpold "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need For a Legal Reappraisal?" (200 I) 
12 European J lnt' L 437. 445 
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Another possible root can be found in domestic law, where such a right is 
22s B h. f common. ut t 1s aces counterarguments as well. Firstly , such a right does not 
exist in every domestic legal system,226 therefore it cannot be concluded that such a 
right is a general principle. Secondly it is problematic to transfer domestic law into 
international law. Both have different origins and purposes. International law 
originally dealt solely with the relationship between states.227 The relevant part of 
domestic law in contrast deals with the relationship between individuals within the 
domestic jurisdiction. As the recognition of rights of individuals under international 
law is only recently on the rise, it is improper to transfer domestic law, grown over 
decades and centuries, without further justification one to one into international law. 
Some argue, however, that humanitarian intervention dates back to the 19th 
century.228 Admittedly interventions already took place in pre-Charter times. 
Nevertheless there is strong evidence that these interventions were not solely 
carried out to protect foreign human beings. Instead strategic-political motivations 
and the rescue of nationals abroad were driving factors.
229 Lastly, domestic law of 
emergency help is mostly not only a right; it is often also a duty .
230 As there are 
lives at stake, no state can be forced to sacrifice human lives without expressing its 
explicit willingness to do so. 
B State Practice 
Under international law a right or duty can emerge from state practise over a 
certain time, if widely recognised and tolerated.
231 Such a practise must be carried 
225 George E Walker " Principles for Collective Humanitarian Interventi on to Succar other Countrie ' 
Imperiled lndigenous Nationals" (2002) 18 AU Int' L Rev 35, 53. 
226 George E Walker "Principles for Co llec tive Humanitarian Intervention to Succar other Countries' 
Impe riled Indigenous ati onals" (2002) 18 AU Int' L Rev 35, 53. 
227 See in general: An tonio Cassese lnternatio11al Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 200 1). 
228 See: Thomas E Behuniak "The Law of Uni lateral Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal Survey" 
(1978) 79 Mil L Rev 157, 159 - 163. 
229 Yogesh K Tyagi "The Concept of Humanitarian lntervention Revisited" (1995) 16 Mich J Int ' L 
883, 885. 
230 See for exa mple: Paragraph 323a StGB (German Criminal Code) . 
231 Ralph Zacklin "The United Nations and Humanitarian Interventi on" (200 1) 41 Ya J lnt ' L 923, 
935. 
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out m a constant manner, the acting states have to act in opinio Juris, and other 
states have to refrain from protest. 232 The true character of interventions in pre-
Charter times is , as already stated, in question. Anyhow, when the UN Charter came 
into effect Article 2 (4) and Article 51 did not allow conclusions to be drawn about 
the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention due to former state practise. One 
argument for legality of humanitarian intervention is the reference to the existence 
of a doctrine of self-defence under customary law.233 Beside the fact that even its 
existence is in dispute,234 this argument has a lack of persuasive power. Self-
defence is already enshrined in Article 51 of UN Charter and an inherent right of 
self-defence can be derived from that. 235 Humanitarian Intervention on the other 
hand is not mentioned in the Charter, therefore it is not sufficient to refer to the 
right of self-defence because the roots and derivations differ. 
Taking the very principle of 's tate practise ' as a basis, it is necessary to 
scrutinize post-Charter cases of unauthorised intervention. The intervention m 
Cambodia met strong objections and the Vietnamese government did not try to 
justify the intervention on humanitarian grounds.2
36 Tanzanian intervention m 
Uganda in contrast was tacitly approved and President Nyerere claimed it to be 
based in part on humanitarian concerns.237 The intervention in Iraq in 1991 as well 
232 Malcolm N Shaw International Law (4'h Ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 64 -
73. 
233 See more detailed: Wil D Yerwey " Humanitarian Intervention" in Antonio Cas ese (Ed) The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986) 67 -
75. 
23~ Compare the diverse opinions regarding use of force of Bowell and Brownlie: D W Bowell Self 
Defence in International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1958); Ian Brownlie 
lmemational Law and the Use of Force by Swtes (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963). 
235 Derek W Bowell "The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad" in Antonio Cassese 
(Ed) The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 
1986)49. 
236 Compare Chapter II A I. 
237 Compare Chapter II A 2. 
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as the one in Kosovo, evoked ambivalent reactions.238 Approval balanced objection, 
but a general and absolute recognition by other states can till now not be concluded. 
Further more the intervening nations viewed their action as just, but they also 
emphasised the uniqueness of the cases and the unwillingness to set precedent. In 
1999 United States Secretary of States Madeleine Albright stated regarding the 
Kosovo intervention as model for future incidents: "I would caution against such 
sweeping conclusions."
239 Humanitarian Intervention as norm under customary law 
faces therefore mainly three problems: First, the chain of comparable state practise 
is quite short to extract an already established custom. Second, recent interventions 
met objections by key players like Russia and China. Finally, even the acting states 
express their will not to set a standard. Although the action provides background to 
contradict that statement, it at least weakens opinio Juris. 
Antonio D' Amato takes the point of view that humanitarian intervention does not 
even contradict the principles of Article 2 (4), as long as it is not directed against 
the teJTitorial integrity or the political independence of a state or it is not otherwise 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter.
240 He refers to the Preamble, which 
points out the importance of human rights to stress that humanitarian intervention is 
not inconsistent with the Charter.241 This argument might be in so far a bit 
simplistic, that 'state sovereignty' is also one of the basic principles of the Charter 
like already mentioned above. The thereupon-derived principle of non-intervention 
has gained jus cogens character under international law. This was emphasised in 
two decisions of the ICJ, the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua and the Corfu Channel Case.
242 
Furthennore the General 
Assembly declared in 1965: "[N]o state has the right to intervent directly or 
238 Compare Chapter 11 A 6 and 7. 
239 Madeleine Albright, United States Secretary of States, "Remarks at the Council on Foreign 
Relations" , (Counci I on Foreign Relations, New York, 28 June 1999), can be found at: 
<http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/transcripts/t_albri ght.html> (last accessed 23 ovember 2003). 
240 Anthony D' Amato "International Law and Kosovo" ( 1999) 33 UN L Rep l 12, l 13. 
241 Anthony D' Amato " International Law and Kosovo" ( 1999) 33 UN L Rep 112, 113 
242 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua !CJ Rep 1986, 
14,205; The Corfu Channel Case 1994 ICJ Rep 4, 35 . 
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indirectly for any reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of other 
states."
243 
Afterwards several Resolutions referred to this Declaration , which was 
also reaffirmed in 1981.
244 
The statement 'for any reason whatsoever' makes clear 
how strong the non-intervention principle is enshrined in international law. So even 
if it is recognised, that humanitarian intervention by itself is not inconsistent with 
the Charter, it nevertheless comes into serious conflict with another fundamental 
principle of international law and the United Nations Charter. How this should be 
balanced seems still to be in question. 
In the light of Kosovo another approach was taken: Under the precondition, that 
the cause to intervene was just, the United Nations failed to take appropriate action, 
although it determined a ' threat to international peace and security', unilateral 
intervention should be permissible.245 Antonio Cassese sees an emerging customary 
law. Nevertheless it cannot be approved that such a right is already in existence, as 
Kosovo is the only precedent. In the case of Iraq in 1991 the inaction was caused 
more by a different approach the United Nations wanted to follow than by an 
. b·1· ~-16 ma 1 1ty to react. -
C Conclusion 
Some scholars regard humanitarian intervention as legal under international 
customary law, while others have a contrary opinion. This reflects the struggle 
humanitarian intervention has to face. On the one hand growing recognition of 
human rights, on the other hand the still strong doctrine of state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention. The rules of necessity seem not to fit for justifying 
the use of force, while state practice is till now not sufficient enough to provide a 
profound legal basis for intervention. Anyway has such a state practise the 
243 Declaration 011 the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of other 
States (1965), UN Doc GNRES/213l(XX). 
244 See: NRES/36/103 (1981). 
245 Antonio Cassese "A Follow Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis" (1999) European J lnt' L 10,79 1,794. 
246 Compare Chapter II A 7. 
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disadvantages, that it is blurred and that it is open to misuse. This would endanger 
the goal to keep the legality of the use of force narrow, tight, and clear defined. 
Further on to leave humanitarian intervention in the hands of unilateral or regional 
collective action without an international responsible body would mean to weaken 
coordination of preventive and forceful measures. However, it is not deniable, that a 
custom starts to take shape. The condemnation of unauthorised intervention 
decreased since intervention in Cambodia. The need to intervene was acknowledged 
several times in recent years. It became common to address severe human rights 
abuses in the Security Council and to determine a 'threat to international peace and 
security ' . Humanitarian intervention as legal means under customary international 
law is on the rise. 
V LEGAL DUTY TO INTERVENE 
Minimum precondition for a legal duty is the legality of the measures. 
However, the willingness to address those situations within Resolutions of the 
Security Council became stronger, but there is still disagreement about which 
measures to take. Eventually this was followed by action by single states or other 
international bodies without consent of the international community. These 
interventions were all highly disputed. Although a couple of interventions took 
place in the past it seems impossible to bring out enough common grounds for 
intervention. As a duty to do something is always based on an unquestioned and 
clear legitimacy to do something, the legitimacy has to be well defined. However, 
there is no clear standard of what is legitimate as we saw in the different reaction of 
states towards humanitarian intervention. States cannot be forced to threaten their 
troops on the basis of such ambiguity. Therefore we can rule out the existence of a 
legal duty to intervene. The need and a possible framework of such a duty will be 
addressed bellow. 
VI CONCLUSION 
With the increasing recognition of human rights under international law in the 
last decades a need to address severe human rights abuses arose. As a last resort 
forceful intervention became common, although in all cases the unique character 
was pointed out. Therefore how to react remains unclear. Strongest legitimisation is 
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provided by Security Council authorisation, but decision-making within the 
Security Council is still inconsistent and aogravated by the struoole with the b bb 
doctrine of state sovereignty. Nevertheless the general will to sanction such 
violations and the past interventions already carried out support the rising of a 
moral duty to intervene. 
A legal right, however, is hard to see till now. Nevertheless it is a desirable aim 
as it enables the international community to put pressure on criminal regimes or 
groups. A way to circumvent the inconsistency of Security Council decisions would 
be to recognize humanitarian intervention under customary international law, but 
this is disadvantageous, too. The increasing use of force in recent times jeopardises 
the strict and narrow rules of use of force, implemented with the United Nations 
Charter. To recognize use of force, that is carried out by different states under 
different excuses may lead unintentionally to new customary international law by 
state practice. Also, involvement by single states or regional organisations was 
often driven by other motivations besides the desire to eliminate human rights 
abuses. Humanitarian intervention as means and excuse to achieve such political 
goals undermines the moral authority of such intervention, which is the basis for the 
legal authority. Further more the existence and allowance of such a resource should 
not compromise attempts to find non-violent solutions. To leave humanitarian 
intervention under the rule of customary international law would support this. 
Therefore it is necessary to create a framework under which that kind of 
intervention can be carried out. 
For a legitimisation as strong as possible this should happen under the umbrella 
of the United Nations. However, Security Council authorisation showed in the past 
serious shortcomings: The slowness and tenaciousness of implementing such 
measures, the lack of coordination with preventive measures, and often the inability 
to find adequate solutions. Another problem is the unsuitableness : The Security 
Council is Jeoitimised to authorise the use of force under the condition of danger for 
b 
international peace and security. As already pointed out above, the Security Council 
had to fall back upon such a dete1mination even if the international peace was not 
really endangered. This also undermines the strict exemptions of the prohibition of 
the use of force. If even the Security Council tends towards a broad interpretation of 
49 
the rules of use of force it is hard to argue aoainst a oeneral erosion of these rules b b , 
which already takes place nowadays . 
This supports the necessity to create a tool, which is faster, more effective and 
more fitted. Humanitarian intervention should be addressed under an explicit legal 
terminology. To leave that with the Security Council ignores another weakness 
though: the composition of the Security Council supports, on the one hand, the 
slowness and on the other it deals with the problem to reach a decision about highly 
regional issues. Therefore it would be helpful to create a new body, just in existence 
to react to severe violations of human rights and finally as last resort to legalise 
humanitarian intervention. It should consist of just a few members to be quick in 
decision-making, in rotating composition, but beneath every member should exist a 
regional body , which is familiar with regional characteristics. This enshrined 
interaction of regional and supra-regional involvement would minimize both 
disadvantages: predomination of self-interest driven intervention, and lack of 
knowledge or ignorance of regional distinctions. To establish a military force under 
the umbrella of the United Nations would be desirable, although the main problem 
might be the lack of political will which can only be overcome politically.
247 
However, a command staff and an allocation of troops by different countries in 
advance would help the system to work effectively. 
However, forceful humanitarian intervention shall be the only means of 
absolute last resort. It has already been mentioned, that some humanitarian 
catastrophes would have been prevented by more effective preventive measures. 
Such preventive measures and an effective early warning system must therefore be 
included in an international framework of humanitarian intervention and are an 
essential precondition for the use of force. Further on are the capabilities of the use 
of force limited. It can only stop the acute abuse, not the causes or roots. Other, 
non-force ful , measures have to accompany intervention. To unite all this under one 
umbrella and authority is necessary to eliminate further inconsistency and 
m See: Michael Rei sman "Peacemaking" ( 1993) 18 Yale J Int ' L 415, 422. 
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ineffectiveness. It also ensures to balance fast and effective reaction with the 
doctrine to manage the situation preferably without the use of force. 
This questions which abuses of human rights should be addressed and should 
justify the use of force. As forceful intervention is a means of last resort and is the 
severest possible interference in states affairs, the terms of its application should be 
strict and narrow. The most intense form of human rights violation is Genocide. 
Even if a state is no party to the Genocide Convention it is now considered to be 
part of customary international law and "has attained the status of jus cogens".
248 
It 
is obvious that a predomination of state sovereignty over human rights is 
unjustified, if it bears extensive lethal consequences. According to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court genocide is also within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, which supports the view that it should be addressed in an international 
framework. 249 The finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes of the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Court provides useful, profound and therefore 
adaptable definitions.250 Severe crimes against humanity should also legitimise 
intervention. These are also within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court. 251 Reference to the finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes can also be 
made.252 
The basic legal framework should be set m the UN Charter to highlight the 
exceptional character of humanitarian intervention concerning the general 
prohibition of the use of force under the Charter. Legally this would balance the 
need for intervention on humanitarian grounds to satisfy the increasing recognition 
of human rights under international law and the undesirable widening of the rules of 
248 Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with 
Security Council resolution 935 (4 October 1994), Doc S/1994/1 125. 
249 Article 6, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), U Doc A/CONF.183/9 . 
250 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the lntemmional Court - Addendwn: Part II -
finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/200/1/ Add.2 (2000). 
251 See: Article 7, Rome Stalllte of the lntemational Criminal Court ( 1998), UN Doc A/CONF.183/9. 
252 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Internacional Court - Addendum: Part II -
finalized draft texc of the Elements of Crimes, U Doc PC lCC/200/1/ Add.2 (2000). 
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use of force. Politically, however, there are admittedly strong obstacles. 
Nevertheless it is worthwhile to work on such a framework instead of leavino it to a b 
growing customary law of humanitarian intervention. Such a custom can hardly 
gain the same undisputed authority. It has barely the same accuracy and precision of 
intensively negotiated and codified legislation. Further more it supports the erosion 
of the strict rules of the use of force. It is obvious that such a custom is on its way, 
but it is up to now insufficient enough to justify forceful intervention on its own. 
Therefore customary international law of humanitarian intervention has some 
obstacles as well and needs also some time to develop into a sufficient enough 
legitimisation to intervene. 
This questions whether humanitarian intervention is prohibited without explicit 
authorisation by the Security Council until such a legal framework is in force. This 
would mean, that human rights would have to take second place to state sovereignty 
till then. To circumvent this problem the determination of a 'threat to international 
peace and security' in context with severe human rights abuses like genocide and 
crimes against humanity by the Security Council should be authorisation enough, if 
other preliminary measures failed. Although the 'exceptional character' of the 
situation was emphasized in nearly every case there is some commonness: When 
the Security Council determined such a threat, some states considered that as 
justification enough to intervene, like in Kosovo or Iraq. State practise consolidates 
such a custom. This point of view has two advantages: Firstly suffering of humans 
imposed by a criminal regime cannot step back behind the protective shield of state 
sovereignty. Secondly, if the Security Council is aware of such consequences when 
calling a situation a 'threat to international peace and security', it will not use this 
phrase in a rash and over-extensive manner, which would otherwise eventually 
undermine the credibility of the appliance of Chapter VII by the Security Council. 
52 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
"Commentaries on the draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts" adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53d session UN 
Doc A/56/10 
Agendafor Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN 
Doc S/24111 (1992) 
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v Slovakia) ICJ Rep 
1997, 7 
Commission on Human Rights Res 2000/ 18, Situation of Human Rights in 
Afghanistan (18 April 2000), UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/18 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984, UN Doc A/39/51 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide I 948, 
adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the UN General Assembly on 9 December 
1948 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), UN Doc 48/49 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of other States ( 1965), UN Doc G A/RES/2131 (XX) 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 
(1992), UN Doc A/47/49 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities (1993), UN Doc A/47/49 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Britain Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human 
Rights Abuses (2 December 2002), can be found at: 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfi le/hrdossier.pdf> (last accessed 3 August 2003) 
Further Report of the Secretary General (17 August 1993), UN Doc S/26317 
George W Bush, President of the United States, "Speech to the United Nations" 
(United Nations General Assembly, New York, 12 September 2002), can be found 
at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/200209 l 2-1.html> (last 
accessed 23 August 2003) 
Interims Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on 
the Situation on Human Rights in Afghanistan (26 September 2001 ), UN Doc 
A/56/409 (1991) 
LAW LIBRARY 
53 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Interims Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Annex to Letter from 
Belgium to the United Nations (5 August 1992), UN Doc S/24386 (1992) 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1969), 660 UNTS 195 
Johannes Rau, German Federal President, "Berlin Speech" (Maxim Gorki Theatre, 
Berlin, 19 May 2003); can be found at: 
<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/,-488168/Bul leti n.htm> (last accessed 
21 July 2003) 
Letter from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations (23 July 
1999), UN Doc S/1999/815 
Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council (31 May 
1991 ), UN Doc S/22663 (1991) 
Letter of the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, UN Doc 
S/1999/342 
Madeleine Albright, United States Secretary of States, "Remarks at the Council on 
Foreign Relations", (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 28 June 1999), can 
be found at: <http://www.foreignpo1icy2000.org/transcripts/t_albright.html> (last 
accessed 23 November 2003) 
Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in 
accordance with Security Council resolution 935 ( 4 October 1994 ), UN Doc 
S/1994/ 1125 
Letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council (4 
October 1994), UN Doc S/1994/1125 
Press Statement on Terrorist Threats by the Security Council President (8 October 
200 l ), UN Doc SC/7167 (200 l) 
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Court - Addendum: 
Part II - finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc 
PCNICC/200/ 1/ Add.2 (2000) 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan (17 September 
1997), UN Doc S/1997/719 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan (18 March 1998), 
UN Doc S/1998/222 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Liberia (23 February 2003), UN 
Doc S/2003/227 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Rwanda (13 May 1994), UN 
Doc SI 1994/565 
54 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Rwanda (3 August 1994 ), UN 
Doc SI 1994/924 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia (22 July 1992), UN 
Doc S/24343 
Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia (24 August 1992), UN 
Doc S/24480 
Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
(9 January 1995), UN Doc S/1995/9 
Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (15 July 1999), UN Doc S/1999/790 
Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation (13 September 
1991), UN Doc A/46/1 (1991) 
Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation ( 13 September 
1991), UN Doc A/46/1 (1991) 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security 
Council on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo (13 
February 2003), UN Doc S/2003/216 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 
Statement by the President of the Security Council (31 August 1998), UN Doc 
S/PRST I 199 8/26 
Tenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organisation Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (15 February 2002), UN Doc S/2002/169 
The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001) Report of the International 
Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty 
Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, "Speech to the Commons" (House of 
Commons, London, 18 March 2003), can be found at: 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0, l 2956,916790,00.html> (last accessed 
28 July 2003) 
Twelfth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (18 October 2002), UN Doc 
S/2002/ 1180 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), UN Doc A/810 
William J Clinton, President of the United States, "Remarks by the President in 
Television Address to the Nation" (Oval Office, Washington DC, 15 September 
55 
1994), can be found at: <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/09/l994-09-l5-president-in-
tv-address-to-nation-on-haiti.html> (last accessed 18 August 2003) 
BOOKS 
Bowett, D W 
Brownlie, Ian 
Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1958) 
International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1963) 
Cassese, Antonio 
Cassese, Antonio 
(Ed) 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) 
The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Martin us 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986) 49 
Detter, Ingrid The Law of War (2
11
ct Ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 
Ronzitti, Natalino Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and 
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 
Shaw, Malcolm N 
Teson, Fernando R 
International Law (41h Ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997) 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and 
Morality (211d Ed, Transnational Publishers, New York, 
1997) 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Behuniak, Thomas E "The Law of Unilateral Intervention by Armed Force: A 
Legal Survey" (1978) 79 Mi! L Rev 159 
Boed, Roman "State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally 
Wrongful Conduct" (2000) 3 Yale H R & Dev L J l 
Boutin, Marc M "Somalia: The Legality of UN Forcible Humanitarian 
Intervention" 17 Suffolk Transn' L Rev 138 
Cassese, Antonio "A Follow Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures 
and Opinio Necessitatis" (1999) European J Int' L 10, 791 
Crocker, Chester A "The Lessons of Somalia; Not Everything Went Wrong" 
(May/ June 1995) Foreign Aff', Comments l 
D' Amato, Anthony "International Law and Kosovo" (1999) 33 UN L Rep 112 
56 
Eisner, Douglas "Humanitarian Intervention in Post-Cold War Era" (1993) 
11 Boston U Int' L J 195 
Falk, Richard "The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order 
Precedent for the United Nations" (1995) 36/2 Harv Int' L J 
341 
Frank, Thomas "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 
86 Am J Int' L 46 
Freeman, Kenneth S "Punishing Attacks on United Nations Peacekeepers: a 
Case Study of Somalia" (1994) 8 Emory Int' L Rev 845 
Gordon, Ruth E "Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and 
Haiti" (1996) 31 Tex Int' L J 43 
Han, Sonia K "Building a Peace That Lasts: The United Nations and 
Post-Civil War Peace-Building" (1994) 26 NYU J Int' L & 
Pol 837 
Hilpold, Peter "Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need For a Legal 
Reappraisal?" (2001) 12 European J Int' L 437 
Hutchinson, Mark R "UN Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an 
Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" (1993) 
34 Harv Int' L J 624 
Kufuor, Kofi Oteng "The OAU and the Recognition of Governments in Africa: 
Analyzing its Practise and Proposals for the Future" (2002) 
17 Am U Int' L Rev 369 
Lecce, DJ "International Law Regarding Pro-Democratic Intervention: 
A Study of the Dominican Republic and Haiti" (1998) 45 
Naval L Rev 247 
Lillich, Richard B "The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human 
Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention 
in the Post Cold War World" (1995) 3 Tulane J Int' & 
Comp L 1 
Majid, Amir A "International Human Rights and the Kurds" (1995) 2 
Annual Survey Int' L & Comp L 53 
Malone, David M "The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study 
in the Creative Interpretation of the UN Charter" (2003) 35 
NYUJ lnt' L & Pol 487 
Mole, Nuala "Who Guards the Guards - The Rule of Law in Kosovo" 
(2001) 3 European Hum Rights L Rev 280 
57 
Nowrojee, Binaifer "Joinning Forces: United Nations and Regional 
Peacekeeping - Lessons from Liberia" ( 1995) 8 Harv 
Human Rights J 129 
Ocran, T Modibo "The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of 
Robust Peacekeeping" (2002) 35 Bost C Int' & Comp L 
Rev 1 
Reisman, W Michael "Peacemaking" (1993) 18 Yale J Int' L 415 
Reisman, W Michael "Article 2 (4): The Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law" (1984) 78 Am Soc lnt' L Proceedings 68 
Sim ma, Bruno "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" 
(1999) 1 EuropeanJint' L 10 
Teson, Fernando R "Collective Humanitarian Intervention" (1996) 17 Mich J 
lnt ' L 323 
Tyagi, Yogesh K 
Yoon, Tania 
Walker, George E 
Weisburd, A Mark 
Woodward, Levi 
Zacklin, Ralph 
"The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited" 
(1995) 16 Mich J Int ' L 883 
"Closing the Gab Between Legitimacy and Legality of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timar and 
Kosovo" (2002) 7 UCLA J Int ' L Foreign Aff 31 
"Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to 
Succar other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous Nationals" 
(2002) 18 AU lnt' L Rev 35 
"International Law and the Problem of Evil" (2001) 34 
Vand J Transn L 225 
"Taylor's Liberia and UN Involvement" (2003) 19 NY L 
Sch Human Rights 923 
'The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention" 
(2001) 41 Va J Int' L 923 
OTHER SOURCES 
"UN Force for Camps in Zaire is Doubtful" (1 January 
1995) New York Times 1, 3 
"Double Trouble for the Kurds (1 April 1992) New York 
Times A 24 
"Afghan Militia Halts Advance After Kabul" (29 September 
1996) The Washington Post A 29 
58 
Annan, Kofi 
Black, Ian 
Carroll, Rory 
Carroll, Rory 
Eisenberg, Daniel 
Fedarko, Kevin 
Frankel, Gleen 
French, Howard W 
French, Howard W 
"Liberia Rejects Ceasefire Offer as Rebels Pound Capital 
Anew" (30 July 2003) New York Times A 4 
"Marines Leave Monrovia after 10 Days Deployment" (25 
August 2003) Washington Times A 14 
"UN Says Congo Rebels Carried Out Cannibalism and 
Rapes" (16 January 2003) New York Times A 5 
"966 Congolese are Killed in Attacks on Villagers" (7 April 
2003) New York Times A 6 
Human Rights Watch Report "Covered in Blood: Ethnically 
Targeted Violence in Northern DRC" (8 July 2003), can be 
found at: <http://hrw.org/reports/2003/i turi0703/DRC0703-
05.htm#P508_74939>; (last accessed 28 October 2003). 
James Astill "UN Troops wait Behind Razor Wire as 
Congo's Streets Run with Blood" (23 May 2003) The 
Guardian London 1 
"Security Council Beefs Up Force in Congo and Broadens 
Mandate" (29 July 2003) New York Times A 8 
"Two Concepts of Sovereignty" (18 September 1999) The 
Economist United States 
"Nato plans Kosovo action" (7 July 1998) The Guardian 
London 12 
"Outbreak of Fighting in Congo Puts Fragile Peace in 
Danger" (18 October 2002) The Guardian London 20 
"Warring Congo Fractions Sign Peace Deal" (18 December 
2002) The Guardian London 13 
"Who will Stop the l(jlling?" (4 August 2003) Time 
Magazine United States 32 
"In Fear of a Nation's Revenge" (29 August 1994) Time 
Magazine United States 56 
"Relief Agencies Balk at US Enclave Plan; UN, Private Aid 
Groups Reluctant to Take Part Without Baghdad's 
Acquiescene" (25 April 1991) The Washington Post A 17 
"Haitian Military and Aristide Sign Pact to End Crisis" (4 
July 1993) New York Times l,l 
"Justice Minister Slain in Defiance of US Warning to 
59 
Geary, James 
Hammer, Joshua 
Hammer, Joshua 
Hammer, Joshua 
Hammer, Joshua 
James, Daniel 
Jansen, G Richard 
Krause, Joachim 
Lewis, Paul 
Marquis, 
Christopher 
Mas land, Tom/ 
Hammer, Joshua 
Michaels, 
Marguerite 
Michaels, 
Marguerite 
Michaels, 
Marguerite 
Morrison, J Stephen 
Military to Keep Peace" (15 October 1993) New York Times 
Al 
"Last Chance for Liberia" (4 November 1996) Time 
Magazine United States 36 
"The Killing Fields" (24 May 1994) Newsweek United 
States 46 
"Death Watch" (8 August 1994) Newsweek United States 
14 
"Running for the Exit" (22 April 1996) Newsweek United 
States 48 
"Into Anarchy" (29 April 1996) Newsweek United States 39 
"What Next in Haiti?" (28 May 1993) The Washington Post 
F3 
"Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. An Abbreviated History" 
(1999), 
<http://lamar.colostate.edu/-grjan/kosovoh istory . html> (last 
accessed 10 April 2003) 
"Deutschland und die Kosovokrise" (2000) 
<http://www.dgap.org/texte/j kkosovo. pdf> (last accessed 
10 April 2003) 
"2 Africa Leaders Die, UN Says: Rocket may have Downed 
Plane" (7 April 1994) New York Times A l 
"US Resists to Send Peacekeepers to Liberia" (22 July 
2003) New York Times A 3 
"Corpses Everywhere" (18 April 1994) Newsweek United 
States 33 
"Descent into Mayhem" (18 April 1994) Time Maga zine 
United States 44 
"Streets of Slaughter" (25 April 1994) Time Magazine 
United States 44 
"Sorry, Wrong Country" (6 June 1994) Time Magazine 
United States 34 
"A Rare Chance for Change" (28 July 2003) Newsweek 
United States 20 
60 
Mureau, Ron 
Noble, Kenneth B 
Noble, Kenneth B 
Perlez, Jane 
Priest, Dana 
Richburg, Keith B 
Rother, Larry 
Sachs, Susan 
Schork, Kurt / 
Webster, Paul 
Sengupta, Somini 
Sengupta, Somini 
Sengupta, Somini 
Stranger, Theodore 
van Biema, David 
Vick, Karl 
Vick, Karl 
"Saddam's Slaughter" (15 April 1991) Newsweek United 
States 22 
"Masses of Liberian Refugees Flee Rebellion and Reprisal 
Killings" (31 January 1990) New York Times A l 
"From Liberian War, Tales of Brutality" (9 July 1990) New 
York Times A 3 
"2 Months after Ousting Despot, Somalia Faces Life as an 
Abandoned Pawn" (4 April 1991) New York Times A 3 
"Iran Poises Its Force On Afghan Border" (5 September 
1998) The Washington Post A 1 
"UN Report Criticizes Military Tactics of Somalia Peace 
Keepers" (5 August 1993) The Washington Post A 22 
L "3000 Troops Land Without Opposition and Take over 
Ports and Airfields in Haiti" (20 September 1994) New York 
Times Al 
"A Grim Graveyard Window in Hussein's Iraq" (l June 
2003) New York Times l, l 
"Belgrade ' blocks food to Kosovo' " (9 September 1998) 
The Guardian London 11 
"Peacekeeping Unit Arrives in Liberia" (5 August 2003) 
New York Times A l 
"Liberian President Resigns as Peacekeepers Enter Capital" 
(8 August 2003) New York Times A 3 
"Congo War Toll Soars as UN Pleads for Aid" (26 May 
2003) New York Times A l 
"Nice Idea, Wrong Country" (4 July 1994) Newsweek 
United States 48 
"Exodus from Rwanda" (25 July 1994) Time Magazine 
United States 34 
"Taylor Resigns, Leaves Liberia" ( 17 August) Washington 
Post A 3 
"Liberian Forces Let Aid into Rural Areas; Request for 
More US Troops Denied" (18 August) Washington Post A 
12 
61 
Weiner, Tim "Interim Liberian Government Head Named" (21 August 
2003) New York Times A 8 
62 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
LAW LIBRARY OF 
A Fine According to Library WELLINGTON 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books LIBRARY 
~f 1li~[1l~1 ~~11~f [1~ i1~111~11~~1l1l1l[111 1l~111 i1~l~ij~ 
3 7212 00719930 8 
h 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
R347 
2003 

